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MAY I ASK YOU A PERSONAL QUESTION? THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND HIV TESTING IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES
Ann E. Stanley*
INTRODUCION

The Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") 2 have afflicted millions of individuals worldwide. In the United States alone, the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") estimate that almost
550,000 people have AIDS,3 with one AIDS diagnosis occurring every
nine minutes.4 In 1994, HIV infection became the most common5
cause of death among persons aged twenty-five to forty-four years,
bringing the issue of HIV/AIDS into the workplace. 6 This issue is not
unique to the United States; according to the United Nations, by the
end of 1996, there were an estimated 750,000 persons living with HIV/
AIDS in North America and 510,000 in Western Europe.7 In 1995,
more than 15,000 cases of AIDS were diagnosed in the European
Community ("Community" or "E.C.") alone,8 and over 20,000 cases
were reported in both 1993 and 1994.9

* The author would like to thank Professor Roger Goebel for his thoughtful
comments.
1. The HIV attaches itself to lymphocytes, white blood cells, essential to the immune system. The lymphocytes are then killed, impairing the immune system and
leaving the body open to opportunistic diseases. Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the
Rationality of Mandatory Testing for te HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental
Public Health Interests with the Individual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. Pitt. L Rev. 327,
329 (1991). For further information regarding the definition of HIV and AIDS, see
Mary Ellen Hombs, AIDS Crisis in America: A Reference Handbook 3-6 (1992);
Jeffrey T. Huber, HIV/AIDS Community Information Services: Experiences in Serving Both At-Risk and HIV-Infected Populations 1-29 (1996).
2. "AIDS represents the latter stages of HIV infection, characterized by the onset of opportunistic infections and cancers associated with the disease." Eisenstat,
supra note 1, at 329 n.10.
3. Center for Disease Control, 1996 HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 5 (1996)
[hereinafter HIV Surveillance Report].
4. Gay Men's Health Crisis, GMHC Facts 1 (1997). There were over 70,000 cases
reported from July 1995 through June 1996. HIV Surveillance Report, supra note 3, at
5.
5. Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection Among Persons Aged 25-44
Years-United States, 1994, 45 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 121, 121 (1996).
6. AIDS Agenda: Emerging Issues in Civil Rights 271 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992); Illana deBare, World of Work Beckons AIDS Patients:
Boosted by New Drug Treatments, Some May Climb Back into Job Market, S.F.
Chron., Mar. 10, 1997, at El.
7. UNAIDS, World AIDS Day Report Documents HIV Threat to New Global
Populations, UNAIDS Press Release, Nov. 28, 1996.
8. Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook '96: A Statistical Eye on Europe 1985-1996
(1996).
9. Id.
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Although there is currently no cure for AIDS, 10 many new treatments enable seropositive" individuals to manage the disease for
longer periods of time.' 2 Due to the severity of the disease, however,
as well as the moral judgments of some of the modes of transmission,
such as sexual relations and drug use, a stigma now surrounds HIV/
AIDS, almost unmatched since the days of leprosy, as well as a fear of
the disease itself. 13 In response, employers on both sides of the Atlantic have grappled with how to provide a safe work environment in the
age of AIDS, often resorting to mandatory HIV testing at the time of
recruitment.' 4 Testing, however, "can produce serious implications
for the individuals tested. In addition to the bodily invasion ... a
positive test result can lead to the loss of employment, housing, education, social and sexual associations, or medical treatment."' Individuals have raised the right to privacy as a defense against testing by
employers.
Both the European Community and the United States have long
traditions of protecting individual rights, including the right to privacy. 1 6 In the context of HIV testing, however, the United States has
10. Huber, supra note 1, at 24.
11. In this Note, "seropositive" is used to indicate seropositivity for the HIV, not
necessarily an individual with AIDS.
12. Carl T. Hall, How Wonder Drugs Give New Life, S.F. Chron., Mar. 10, 1997, at
El (quoting a doctor who says that new drugs provide not only "a little more time"
but also the "possibility of living out a full life-span"); Lisa M. Krieger, Good News on
AIDS Deaths Has a Flip Side: More People Living with the Disease Will Need LongTerm Care, S.F. Examiner, Feb. 28, 1997, at A2 (reporting that not only has there
been "a large drop in deaths in the past two years, but also a drop in the need for
hospitalization, home care, hospice care and specialist referrals"); Oscar Suris, AIDS
Deaths Drop Significantly for First Time, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1997, at BI (reporting
that the CDC said "12% fewer Americans with AIDS died from the disease in the
first half of 1996 than during the same period a year earlier-the first marked decline
in the death toll since the epidemic's emergence 15 years ago").
13. Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp 402, 413 (N.D. Ohio
1991) ("Failure to maintain confidentiality [about] HIV status creates a likelihood of
discrimination.... ."); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J.
1990) (noting the "stigma and harassment that comes with public knowledge of one's
affliction with AIDS"); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elies Steyger, AIDS Victims in
the European Community and the United States: Are They Protectedfrom Unjustified
Discrimination,24 Tex. Int'l L.J 295, 310 (1989) (stating "many view AIDS as the
modem equivalent of leprosy"); Patrick Twomey, Case Comment, X v. Commission,
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1013, 1022-23 (1995) (noting that in protecting the rights of
people with AIDS the victimization caused by the disease must be considered); Clare
Ansberry, Fearand Loathing: AIDS, Stirring Panic and Prejudice, Tests the Nation's
Character,Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at I (quoting one AIDS victim who said, "I know
what it's like to be a leper").
14. See infra parts I.C., II.A.2.b, II.B.2. This Note will focus on testing by public
employers only.
15. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 310.
16. Privacy has been defined in many ways, although it can be separated into two
basic categories: the right governing "the conduct of other individuals who intrude in
various ways upon one's life," (an informational privacy interest), and the right which
immunizes certain conduct from government proscription or penalty, (a substantive
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gone further than the European Community in its protection of seropositive individuals, providing constititutional as well as statutory
guarantees.17 Although neither region's constitutional case law adequately upholds the individual's right to privacy, the United States
better protects this right under its statutory framework, setting an example upon which the European Community could base its own legislative scheme.'8
This Note focuses on HIV testing policies of public employers in the
United States and of the European Community's own institutions. 19
Part I examines E.C. law, including the rights of privacy and protecright to privacy). Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L Rev. 737, 740
(1989); see also infra part ll.A. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev. 962, 963
(1964) (proposing a theory to reconcile the "divergent strands of legal developments"
in the right's interpretation and application); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475
(1968) (examining the foundations of the right); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393 (1978) (analyzing the informational right from an economic
perspective).
Several sources of the right to privacy are: (1) tort law, see Fowler V. Harper et al.,
The Law of Torts §§ 9.5-9.7 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1996); J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl,
Modem Tort Law: Liability & Litigation §§ 48.01-48.20 (rev. ed. 1996); John D.
Blackburn et al.,
Invasion of Privacy: Refocusing the Tort in Private Sector Employment, 6 DePaul Bus. L.J. 41 (1993); (2) state protections, see Margaret C. Crosby,
Rights of Privacy, in Recent Developments in State Constitutional Law 231 (1985);
and (3) constitutional protections, see Darien A. McWhirter & Jon D. Bible, Privacy
as a Constitutional Right: Sex, Drugs, and the Right to Life (1992); Francis S.
Chlapowski, Note, The ConstitutionalProtection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L
Rev. 133 (1991); see also Peter J. Nanula, Comment, ProtectingConfidentiality in the
Effort to Control AIDS, 24 Harv. J. on Legis. 315, 334-35 (1987) (listing potential
causes of action for AIDS plaintiffs).
For a discussion of the sources of the right to privacy in the EC, see Carlos A. Ball,
The Making of a TransnationalCapitalistSociety: The Court of Justice, Social Policy,
and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal Order, 37 Harv. Int'l
LJ.307, 367-86 (1996); Manfred A. Dauses, The Protectionof FundamentalRights in
the Community Legal Order, 10 Eur. L. Rev. 398 (1985); Joseph H.H. Weiler,
Eurocracy and Distrust7 Some Questions Concerningthe Role of the European Court
of Justice in the Protectionof FundamentalHuman Rights Within the Legal Order of
the European Communities, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1103 (1986). See also infra part L.A
(examining the foundation for the right to privacy).
In both regions, the right to privacy is actionable against the government.
Rubenfeld, supra, at 737 (stating privacy rights are constitutional rights that "delineat[e] the legitimate limits of governmental power"); Weiler, supra, at 1108 (stating
"protection of human rights is typically designed to protect the individual against public authority").
17. See infra part IU.B.
18. Dworkin & Steyger, supra note 13, at 302-03.
19. This Note will not discuss Member State laws in this area. See generally Lisa
Waddington, Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilitiesin Europe.: From
Quotas to Anti-DiscriminationLaws, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 62 (1996) (discussing Member State disability laws); Dworkin & Steyger, supra note 13 (comparing testing and
movement restriction on AIDS victims in the EC with discrimination under the US
statutory scheme); J.Pals Macedo van Overbeek, AIDS/HIV Infection and the Free
Movement of Persons Within the European Economic Community, 27 Common Mkt.
L. Rev. 791 (1990) (discussing movement restrictions in the European Community).
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tion of medical secrets, founded by Community case law and now enshrined in the Treaty on European Union. This part also reviews two
recent cases brought by employment candidates against the Commission of the European Communities. Part II discusses relevant U.S.
law, first by examining constitutional rights arising from the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and then by discussing two statutory provisions, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act")20 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").2 ' Part III compares the two
systems, analyzes the courts' reasoning in cases under these laws, and
evaluates how well each system protects the right to privacy of HIVinfected individuals in the employment context. This part finds that
although each region has a proper policy approach to the issue, because of the fear and paranoia surrounding HIV/AIDS and the failure
by the courts to consider properly the risk of transmission, courts have
not applied the law in a way that adequately protects the individual's
right to privacy. This Note concludes that the United States guards
this right better as a result of the protection mandated by the disability statutes, and suggests that protection of the right to privacy would
be better guaranteed if the European Community were to adopt legislation similar to what exists in the United States.

20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994). For further discussion, see James F. Baxley, RehabilitatingAIDS-Based Employment Discrimination: HIV Infection as a Handicap
Under the Vocational RehabilitationAct of 1973, 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 23 (1989) (discussing how HIV qualifies as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act); Walter B.
Connolly, Jr. & Alison B. Marshall, An Employer's Legal Guide to AIDS in the Workplace, 9 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 561 (1990) (discussing employers' responsibilities
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act in the AIDS context); Mark C. Weber,
Disability Discriminationby State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct and Title II of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,
36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1089 (1995) (comparing the two Acts).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For further discussion, see Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: An Overview of the
Employment Provisions, 33 S. Tex. L. Rev. 759 (1992) (discussing generally the
ADA); Mark Cody et al., Americans with Disabilities Act: Emerging Caselaw, 75
Mich. B.J. 382 (1996) (discussing recent cases arising under the ADA); Tinothy M.
Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Move to Integration,64 Temp. L. Rev.
393 (1991) (discussing government-sponsored discrimination against disabled persons
and the adoption of the ADA); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1568, 1602-46 (1996) (evaluating the ADA and protection of
homosexuals in private employment); Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinationsand Inquiries Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A View from the Inside, 64 Temp.
L. Rev. 521 (1991) (discussing the development of the ADA and the medical inquiries
provisions); P. Kathleen Lower, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Regulations,
Technical Assistance Manual and Developing Case Law, 23 Colo. Law. 807 (1994)
(providing a summary explanation of the ADA's key provisions); Dick Thornburgh,
The Americans with DisabilitiesAct. What It Means to All Americans, 64 Temp. L.
Rev. 375 (1991) (discussing generally the ADA); Bless S. Young & Kimberly R. Wells,
Managing AIDS in the Workplace, 41 No.3 Prac. Law. 41 (1995) (providing an employer's guide to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in the HIV/AIDS context).
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw

The European Community is a supranational entity composed of
fifteen Member States that have exchanged sovereignty in certain sectors for the benefits of uniformity.' The European Community has
several institutions,23 including: the Council of the European Union;2 4

the European Commission;25 the European Parliament; 26 and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court"). 27 While the founding

treaties establish the nature and scope of the European Community's
power,' the ECJ has the role of interpreting the meaning of their
provisions. 29
22. The Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. See Commission of the European Communities, Serving the
European Union: A Citizen's Guide to the Institutions of the European Union 10
(1996) [hereinafter A Citizen's Guide].
23. Other E.C. institutions include the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions, and the Court of Auditors. Id.at 19-20, 24-27.
24. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 224)
1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), arts. 145-54 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The Council has
a rotating Presidency, held by each Member State for a period of six months, and
functions in the framework of meetings hosted by the current Presidency. Ministers
of each Member State responsible for the topic at hand attend the meetings to discuss
and vote on proposed legislation. A Citizen's Guide, supra note 22, at 9-10.
25. The Commission is responsible for the administration of Community matters
and retains the sole power to propose legislation. See EC Treaty arts. 155-63.
26. One of the European Parliament's functions is to review all proposed legislation. The Parliament then votes on whether to recommend adoption of the measure
and issues an opinion. See EC Treaty arts. 137-44.
27. The ECI is aided by the Court of Frst Instance ("CFI"), which has jurisdiction
over all staff cases as well as competition and antidumping cases. The CFI's decisions
are appealable to the ECJ only for review of a point of law. See EC Treaty arts. 16488; George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Community Law 73
(1993) [hereinafter Bermann et al., EC Law); George A. Bermann et al., Cases and
Materials on European Community Law 25 (1995 Supp.) [hereinafter Bermann et al.,
1995 Supp.].
28. There are three founding treaties: Treaty Instituting the European Coal and
Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; the EC Treaty, and the Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Mar. 25,1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167. The Treaty Establishing the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 719 (1992) [hereinafter TEU], amended the original
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, as amended by Single European Act, Feb. 17. 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 (1987), dropping the word "Economic" from its name to reflect that the
goals of the EC Treaty go beyond forming a purely economic community and include
political union as well. The TEU also established the Common Foreign and Security
Policy and coordination in the fields of justice and home affairs. Bermann et al., EC
Law, supra note 27, at 16-19; Bermann et al, 1995 Supp., supra note 27, at 2-4.
Although references to both the terms "EC" and "EU" are correct, this Note will use
"EC" because the law discussed is EC law, not EU law. See Bermann et al., 1995
Supp., supra note 27, at 4.
29. For a more complete analysis of the European Community, see Ian Barnes &
Pamela M. Barnes, The Enlarged European Union (1995); James D. Dinnage & John
F. Murphy, The Constitutional Law of the European Union (1996); Europe after
Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1994); T.C. Hartley, The
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A. Foundationfor the Right to Privacy
The European Community respects fundamental rights, including
the right to privacy and protection of medical information. To this
end, the Council and the Member States have issued Conclusions that
establish guidelines for the treatment of HIV and AIDS in the employment context. 30 However, because of the European Commission's policy of requesting recruits to undergo an HIV test during the
obligatory prerecruitment medical exam, several cases have arisen in
which both the ECJ and the Court of First Instance ("CFI" or
"court") have addressed the privacy concerns raised by candidates.31
1. Right to Privacy Stemming from Human Rights
The initial Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
("EEC Treaty") did not contain a catalogue of basic rights, but did
recognize three human rights specifically: freedom from discrimination based on nationality; 32 the right of personal mobility between
Member States for workers33 and self-employed individuals;3 and the
right to equal pay.35 In 1969, the ECJ first articulated, in dicta, the
concept of "fundamental rights enshrined in the general principles of

Community law" in Stauder v. Ulm. 36 In InternationaleHandelsgesell-

schaft v. Einfuhr,37 the ECJ reaffirmed the notion that the Community
ensures the protection of fundamental human rights, and named itself
the principal guarantor of such rights. 38 As the ECJ later stated in
Nold v. Commission,39 "[i]n safeguarding these rights, the Court is
bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to
Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional
and Administrative Law of the European Community (1994).
30. See infra part I.B.
31. Case 404/92, X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737; Case 10/93, A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-179 (Ct. First Instance), [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 242 (1994).
Shortly after the CFI decided A v. Commission, the Commission stated that
"[tjhere is no compulsory or systematic HIV screening either at pre-recruitment medical examinations or at annual medical check-ups." Written Question E-2872/93 by
Carole Tongue to the Commission, 1995 O.J. (C 17) 7, 8. At pre-recruitment medical
exams, candidates are given information on the disease and how a positive result
would affect their chances of recruitment. Id. According to the Commission, asymptomatic candidates are not rejected, but symptomatic candidates may be refused. This
assessment can be derived from case history as well as the clinical exam. Id. While
testing is not mandatory, the Commission clearly retains the power to test consenting
candidates at will. See id.
32. EC Treaty art. 6.
33. It art. 48.
34. Id art. 52.
35. Id. art. 119.
36. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, [1970] C.M.L.R. 112
(1970).
37. Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255 (1972).
38. Id at 1146.
39. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, [1974] C.M.L.R. 338 (1974).
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the Member States" 4" as well as international treaties, notably the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ("ECHR").4'
The Court therefore cannot "uphold measures which are incompatible
with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States. '4 2 The ECJ made clear, however, that such
rights are not absolute and may be "subject to certain limits justified
by the overall objectives pursued by the Community, on condition
that the substance of these rights is left untouched."43 Because the
European Community is principally concerned with economic fields
of action, the Court has usually dealt with economic issues resulting in
the recognition of economic rights, such as the right to property;"
however, the ECJ has also recognized personal rights, including the
right to privacy.4 5 In 1977, the institutions issued a Joint Declaration
adopting the protection of fundamental rights, and in particular those
articulated in the ECHR. 4 This Declaration is not judicially binding,
however,4" and while all Member States are parties to the ECHR, the
Community itself is not.' This limits the legal force with which the
E.C. institutions may uphold the Convention's provisions. The institutions, however, have pursued a more formal recognition of those
rights.
40. Id. at 507.
41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. The ECHR protects both civil
rights (such as the right to liberty and security of person, and the right to a private and
family life) and freedoms (freedom from torture, slavery, and forced labor as well as
the freedom of expression, thought, conscience, and religion). See Dr. John Breslin,
Privacy-The Civil Liberties Issue, 14 Dick. J. Int'l L. 455 (1996); Mary F. Dominick,
Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European Community Charterof Fumdamental Social Rights, 14 Fordham Int'l LJ.639 (1990-91) (discussing privacy under
U.S. law and the ECHR); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of
Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev 537, 558-61 (1988) (same); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and
InternationalJudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process
Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 Hastings LJ. 805 (1990) (same); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Note, Autonomy, Community, and Traditionsof Liberty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 1398, 1415-20 (discussing
the ECHR and Article 8(2)).
42. Nold, 1974 E.C.R. at 507.
43. Id. at 508.
44. See, e.g., Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.RI 3727, 3745,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42 (1980) (upholding the right to property under Community law).
45. See, e.g., Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419,425 (upholding a
Community provision as it contained "nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law"). The Court
has also recognized the principle of equal treatment on religious grounds, Case 130/
75, Prais v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 1597-99, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 708 (1976), the
freedom of expression, Case 100/88, Oyowe & Traore v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R
4285, 4309, and the right to participate in trade unions, Case 193/87, Maurissen v.
Court of Auditors, 1990 E.C.R. 1-95, 118.
46. Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of April 5, 1977, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1.
47. See EC Treaty art. 189 (listing the force of legislative measures).
48. Bermann et al., EC Law, supra note 27, at 146.
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In 1976, the Commission ruled out the necessity of Community accession to the ECHR.4 9 In 1979, however, the Commission issued a
report endorsing the European Community's formal accession to the
ECHR,5 ° and, more recently, again advocated accession, 51 as did the
European Parliament.5 2 In 1992, the Treaty on European Union
("TEU") introduced Article F, which provides that the "Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, as general principles of Community law."'53 This political statement of adherence by the E.C. institutions to the doctrine developed
by the ECJ formally makes human rights principles part of the Community's own "constitutional law." 54 In 1994, the Council requested
an opinion from the Court on whether the Community's accession to
the ECHR would be permissible under the EC Treaty.5 5 The ECJ
held that the Community did not have the competence to accede to
the ECHR because there is no Treaty provision granting it power to
"enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions
in this field." 56 The Court also stated that it could not rule on the
"compatibility of Community accession to the Convention" because
the Council did not provide the Court with information regarding "the
Community['s submission] to the jurisdiction of an international
court."57 Still, the ECJ has already held that the Convention has "special significance" as a source of Community policy58 and the ECJ has
49. Case Comment, Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention (Opinion 2/94), [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265, 273 (1996) [hereinafter
Case Comment, Opinion 2/94].
50. See Commission of the European Communities, Thirteenth General Report
on the Activities of the European Communities 276 (1979).
51. See Commission of the European Communities, Twenty-Fourth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 354 (1990).
52. See Commission of the European Communities, Twenty-Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 347-48 (1993).
53. TEU art. F.
54. Bermann et al., EC Law, supra note 27, at 146. The justiciability of Article F is
questionable, however, because it is not included in the list of those provisions to
which the ECJ may exercise its powers of review. TEU art. L. See generally Lars B.
Krogsgaard, FundamentalRights in the European Community After Maastricht,1993/1
Legal Issues of Eur. Integration 99 (discussing fundamental rights after entry into
force of the TEU).
55. Commission of the European Communities, Twenty-Seventh Report of the
Activities of the European Communities 347-48 (1994).
56. Case Comment, Opinion 2/94, supra note 49, at 290.
57. Id. at 289; see also Bermann et al., 1995 Supp.; supra note 27, at 46 (discussing
the prospects for future accession to the ECHR); Giorgio Gaja, Case Comment,
Opinion 294, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 973
(1996) (discussing the ECJ's opinion on the Community's accession to the ECHR).
58. Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, 2639, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R.
328 (1991) (stating that the ECHR "can... supply guidelines to which regard should
be had in the context of Community law"); Case Comment, Opinion 2/94, supra note
49, at 291.
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embraced many of the ECHR's rights already, including Article 8 of
59
the ECHR, which concerns the right to privacy.
The ECJ first recognized the right to privacy in Stauder v. Ulm. ° A
German veteran, Stauder, who received welfare benefits challenged a
provision in the German-language version of a Council Decision that
allowed the sale of butter at reduced prices to welfare recipients upon
presentation of a coupon bearing the beneficiary's name.6 ' Stauder
argued that the name provision on the coupon required him to disclose his name and thus violated his right to privacy. 62 Based on its
liberal interpretation of a discrepancy among the language versions of
the Decision, the ECJ ruled that the disputed provision contained
nothing "capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law."' 63 The ECJ has
also recognized the right to privacy in other cases, primarily in the
field of competition law. 64
2. Right to Medical Secrets
The ECJ has included the protection of medical information within
the right to privacy. In Commission v. Germany,' the ECJ struck
down a German law prohibiting imports of medicinal products prescribed by a doctor in another Member State unless ordered through a
German pharmacy.' While Germany admitted that the statute constituted a restriction on the free movement of goods and was therefore
incompatible with Article 30 of the EC Treaty,67 it claimed that the
statute was "essential in order to guarantee effective protection of the
59. Article 8 reads: "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of [the right to respect for an individual's private and family life, his home
and his correspondence] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of... public safety or... for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." ECHR,
supra note 41, art. 8(2).
60. Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
61. Stauder, 1969 E.C.R. at 421-22. Other language versions only stated that "a
'coupon referring to the person concerned' must be shown, thus making it possible to
employ other methods of checking in addition to naming the beneficiary." Id. at 424.
62. See id.at 420-21.
63. Id. at 425.
64. See, e.g., Case 5/85, Akzo Chemie v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 2585, 2603,
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 716 (1987) (stating in the Advocate General's opinion that the right
to privacy "is available not merely to natural persons but also to legal persons in so far
as it can be applied to them"); Case 136179, National Panasonic v. Commission, 1980
E.C.R. 2033, 2057, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169 (1980) (holding that Article 14(3) of Regulation 17, dealing with competition law, is in conformity with the ECHR's Article
8(2)).
65. Case 62/90, 1992 E.C.R. 1-2575, [1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 549 (1992).
66. Md at 2611. In practice, the statute affected only postal consignments. Id. at
2606.

67. Article 30 prohibits "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect." EC Treaty art. 30.
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health and life of humans. '68 Germany argued, inter alia, that it was
impossible to ensure during border checks, without violating the rights
of privacy and protection of medical secrets, that medicinal products
were being imported only in quantities sufficient for personal use.
Germany thus argued that a ban on such imports was justified by the
objective of protection of health.69
The ECJ agreed that while the right to privacy and the right to protection of medical secrets in particular are fundamental within the
Community, they are not absolute rights. 70 The Court held that a restriction on those rights may be justified by the objective of the protection of public health, provided the restriction actually promotes the
objectives of the general interest and is not disproportionate to the
extent that it would interfere with the very substance of those rights.7 '
The ECJ then held the German measure illegal, concluding that Germany had failed to show that it would in fact be impossible to implement controls which would protect public health without also
excessively interfering in the privacy of medical secrets.72 This Note
suggests that this area of protection should logically extend to one's
HIV status.
B.

Resolution and Conclusions on AIDS and the Workplace

The Council has also recognized the importance of protecting privacy in individuals' medical information generally, and in HIV status
in particular. In December 1988, the Council and the Ministers for
Health of the Member States adopted Conclusions on AIDS and the
workplace ("Conclusions").73 The following year, the Council called
for discussion of the implementation of the Conclusions in a Resolution on the fight against AIDS. 74
68. Commission v. Germany, 1992 E.C.R. at 2606. Protection of public health is a
justification for such restrictions under Article 36 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty art. 36.
69. Commission v. Germany, 1992 E.C.R. at 2606-08.
70. See id. at 2609.
71. Id
72. Id. at 2609-10.
73. Conclusions of Dec. 15, 1988 of the Council and the Ministers for Health of
the Member States Concerning AIDS and the Place of Work, 1989 O.J. (C 28) 2
[hereinafter Conclusions]. Conclusions are statements agreed upon by the Council
and the Member State ministers, but do not have the force of Recommendations unless the Council then adopts a Resolution recommending implementation of the
Conclusions.
74. Resolution of Dec. 22, 1989 of the Council and the Ministers for Health of the
Member States on the Fight Against AIDS, 1990 O.J. (C 10) 3, 6 [hereinafter Resolution]. In the Community hierarchy of legal norms, the Council Resolution constitutes
a recommendation, not legislation; hence the Resolution and the Conclusions are not
binding. See EC Treaty art. 189. They are, of course, intended to influence Member
States' laws and policy. PJ.G. Kapteyn & P. Verloren Van Themaat, Introduction to
the Law of the European Communities: After the Coming into Force of the Single
European Act 187-88 (2d ed. 1989). In addition, the Community institutions regard
the Conclusions as stating rules of good practice that the Commission should follow in
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The Conclusions state that because "[p]eople infected with the HIV
virus or suffering from AIDS pose no danger to their colleagues at
work, [t]here are hence no grounds for screening potential recruits for
HIV antibodies."'75 They also state that there is no risk of IXV infection in the field of "body treatments," (presumably, medical procedures), if proper hygiene guidelines are followed.76 Employees who
are asymptomatic should be looked on and treated as fit for work and
should be under no obligation to disclose their medical status to their
employers.' The Conclusions also recommend that if knowledge of
HIV status is obtained, the employer "should make every effort to
protect that person from stigmatization and discrimination" and maintain medical confidentiality.7" Finally, the Conclusions dictate that
employees suffering from AIDS should be treated like employees
with other serious illnesses that affect their performance, and "[w]here
fitness is impaired, duties or working hours should be adjusted so that
such employees may continue working as long as possible."79
The Resolution called for elimination of "all forms of discrimination, particularly in recruitment [and] at the workplace."0 The Resolution also noted that "no public health reason justifies the systematic
and compulsory screening of individuals, i.e. screening without prior
information or consent of the persons tested,"'" and that any discrimination. 2 against AIDS or HIV-infected individuals violates human
rights
C. Case Law Regarding HIV Testing by E.C. Institutions
Two candidates have brought cases against the Commission alleging
that HIV testing during the recruitment procedure invaded their right
internal staff matters. Case 10/93, A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. U-179, 205-06 (Ct.
First Instance). Moreover, the ECI has considered Council Resolutions in other cases
such as Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena. Case 149/
77, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 1376, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 312 (1978) (citing a Council Resolution
for support of the principle of "elimination of discrimination based on the sex of
workers"); Case 362/88, GB-Inno v. Confederation du Commerce Luxembourgeois,
1990 E.C.Rt 1-667, 687-88, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801 (1991) (citing a Council Resolution
to demonstrate link in Community policy between consumer protection and information); Cases C-241-42191, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R, 1-743,
790, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. (Antitrust) 718 (1995) (citing in the Advocate General's opinion the Council Resolution on Member State accession to the Berne Convention to
demonstrate Community interest in protecting intellectual property rights to the same
extent as the Convention).
75. Conclusions, supra note 73, at 2.
76. Id
77. 1&
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Resolution, supra note 74, at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id-
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to privacy and violated Article 8 of the ECHR: X v. Commission83
and A v. Commission'.
1. X v. Commission
In X v.
prospective employee appealed a Commission staff decision finding that the Commission did not violate his
right to privacy.86 X was a Portuguese national who had worked on a
freelance basis for the Commission and then applied for a temporary
post of six months as a typist in the Portuguese Translation Division.87
As part of the application procedure, X underwent a medical examination, at which he declined to submit to an HIV test. 8 After considering the results of the clinical examination, the medical officer
ordered supplementary blood tests,89 from which he concluded that X
was suffering from "a significant immune deficiency which rendered
him unfit to perform the duties of a member of the temporary staff."9
X pursued all relevant administrative avenues to protest this decision
and eventually brought the action to the CF191 and then the ECJ.
The CFI accepted X's argument that performing an HIV test without the patient's informed consent is an interference with physical integrity and hence violates the right to privacy. 92 The court refused to
find, however, that X had in fact been subjected to an HIV test or a
dissimulated HIV test because the T4/T8 tests cannot determine seropositivity. 93 Thus, the CFI concluded that X's right to privacy had not
been breached.
On appeal to the ECJ, the Court benefitted from a long and detailed analysis by Advocate General Van Gerven. 94 In his opinion, the
Commission,85 a

83. Case 404/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737.

84. Case 10/93, A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-179 (Ct. First Instance).
85. For commentary on X v. Commission, see Eddy De Smijter, Case Comment,
Case "X," I Colum. J. Eur. L. 332 (1995); Twomey, supra note 13; Jane Moorman,
Legal Update: How Mr. X Kept His Privacy and Lost His Job, The Guardian, July 15,

1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, NEWS library, CURNWS file.
86. The CH affirmed the Commission Decision, essentially holding that the Commission violated neither Article 8 of the ECHR nor the Conclusions since the applicant had not been subjected to an HIV test or a dissimulated HIV test and that, as a
result, there was no invasion of privacy. Joined Cases T-121/89 and T-13/90, X v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 11-2195, 2218 (Ct. First Instance).
87. Written Question No. 1751/90 by Mr. Joaquim Miranda Da Silva to the Commission of the European Communities of July 12, 1990, 1991 OJ. (C 115) 10.
88. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 4739-40.

89. The results of these tests, determining X's T4 and T8 lymphocyte counts, can
provide "sufficient information to conclude that the candidate might be" HIV-positive. Id. at 4791.

90. Id. at 4740.
91. Joined Cases T-121/89 and T-13/90, 1992 E.C.R. 11-2195 (Ct. First Instance).
92. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 4791.
93. ld. at 4748.
94. The Advocate General's function is to conduct an independent examination of
the case and present an opinion to the ECJ. Bermann et al., EC Law, supra note 27, at
71.
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Advocate General noted that while "the [ECHR] does not form a direct part of Community law," the basic rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the ECHR are "enforceable as general principles
of Community law."95 The Advocate General cited Article 8(2) of the
ECHR, which provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of [the privacy right] except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of...
public safety or... for the protection of health or96morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Advocate General then identified two primary issues following
the two-prong test established in Commission v. Germany:' whether
the tests carried out in the prerecruitment exam constituted an interference with X's private life; and if so, whether such interference was
justified by the public interests referred to in Article 8(2). 93 As to the
first prong, the Advocate General considered the interference in light
of the principle of informed consent. 99 Although the Commission argued that X could not invoke his right to privacy because he voluntarily participated in a recruitment procedure that included a medical
exam, the Advocate General nonetheless held that X's privacy right
had been infringed upon in these circumstances.100 The Advocate
General found that the medical officer, the medical committee, and
the Commission all attached far-reaching consequences to the outcome of the supplementary tests that were not normally part of the
medical exam. 10 1 For instance, the medical officer determined on the
basis of the results that X suffered from full-blown AIDS and was
therefore physically unfit for recruitment.1 2 By ordering a supplementary exam in order to reach indirectly the same result as an HIV
test, the medical officer violated X's privacy right. On these facts, the
Advocate General concluded that X should have been informed of
[T]he parties [of the case] do not comment on the Advocate General's opinion and the Court is in no respect bound to follow or be influenced by it.
Traditionally, however, the opinion carries great weight in the Court's deliberations and often the Court will reach the same conclusion, though perhaps
on different grounds. The opinion of the Advocate General ...is cited by
academic writers and is likely to influence the later evolution of the case law.
Id. at 72.
95. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 4750; see also supra part I.A. (discussing case
law and the TEU's Article F).
96. ECHR, supra note 41, art. 8(2).
97. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong balancing test).
98. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.IR at 4763.
99. The Advocate General did not establish a broad rule regarding when informed
consent is necessary. He considered only the question whether informed consent was
necessary in the circumstances of the case at hand. Id.
100. Id. at 4761.
101. Id
102. 1&
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both the proposal to submit him to T4/T8 tests and the scope and
possible consequences of undergoing or refusing to undergo the
tests.'0 3
The Advocate General then considered the second prong of the balancing test: whether the restriction furthered an objective of general
interest pursued by the Community without constituting an intolerable infringement on the substance of the rights guaranteed. 0 4 The
Advocate General agreed with the Commission's assertion that its objective was the protection of health-a medical exam which might prevent the candidate from being recruited to a post that could possibly
endanger his state of health did in fact "protect health."'1 5 Mr. Van
Gerven also accepted as a legitimate concern the assertion that a test
to screen out such candidates would protect the health of other employees because the appointment of a candidate who could not properly perform his duties might result in "overwork and additional
stress" for his colleagues.' 6
Although the Commission's conduct passed the test's two prongs,
the Advocate General found that the T4/T8 tests failed the proportionality requirement. While a general prerecruitment exam with a
candidate's general consent "is undeniably proportionate" to the objective of protection of health, a more searching exam demands the
candidate's informed consent. 10 7 This is particularly true when the
supplementary exam is an immune deficiency test and the candidate
has already refused to undergo an HIV test.'08
In its judgment, the ECJ reaffirmed the balancing test it established
in Commission v. Germany.109 The Court found that while the prerecruitment examination served a legitimate interest, X's right to privacy mandated that the Commission respect his refusal to submit to
an HIV test in its entirety. The ECJ stated that "[s]ince the [candidate] expressly refused to undergo an AIDS screening test, that right
precluded the administration from carrying out any test liable to point
to ... that illness, in respect of which he had refused disclosure."' 110
The Court annulled the Commission's decision that X did not satisfy
the conditions as to physical fitness for recruitment."'
103. Id

104. Id at 4762.
105. Id at 4763.
106. Id
107. Id at 4764.
108. Id
109. Case 62/90, 1992 E.C.R. 1-2575, 2609; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the two-prong balancing test).
110. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 4791.
111. Procedurally, after annulment of both the CFI's opinion and the Commission
Decision, the case is "remanded" to the Commission, which would either reconsider
X for the temporary post, or settle for damages.
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The Court added in dicta, however, that the institutions are not required to take the risk of recruiting a candidate who refuses to undergo tests that the medical officer believes to be necessary to
determine eligibility for the post." 2 This language seriously hampers
the protection of the individual's right to privacy that the Court
Court's
seemed to guarantee in the case and is not consistent with the
13
role as guarantor of fundamental rights in the Community.'
2. A v. Commission
The candidate in A v. Commission114 underwent the same prerecruitment medical exam as X, but instead of refusing an HPV test, A
voluntarily informed the medical officer that he was HIV positive and
willingly submitted to the test." 5 The medical officer concluded that
A was unfit for the "nature of the post,""16 an administrative position
in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific ("ACP") region." 7 A argued
that the purported objective of the Commission's prerecruitment
exam-to avoid major future costs-was economic in character and
unjustified under any of the objectives listed in Article 8 of the
ECHR. 1 8 A also argued that the test violated his right to privacy
because his voluntary disclosure made the test superfluous." 9
The CFI applied Commission v. Germany's balancing test. The CFI
first determined that the objective of the exam was to enable the
Commission either to avoid hiring a candidate unsuitable for the duties of that post or to assign duties compatible with a hired candidate's
physical condition.' 20 The CI then looked to the Member State traditions and found that such objectives were lawful "within any system
of public administration," particularly because prerecruitment medical
exams were common to most Member States.' 2' The CFI therefore
concluded that the exam "cannot be regarded as... contrary to the
principle of respect for a person's private life."" 2
112. Id at 4790. By articulating this conclusion, the ECJ did not expressly permit
the institutions to discriminate against HIV-positive candidates; this may be the result, however, because medical determinations are generally beyond the scope of judicial review. See infra notes 123, 130 and accompanying text.
113. See infra part III.B.2.
114. Case 10/93, A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R 11-179 (Ct. First Instance).
115. d. at 185.
116. Id at 186.
117. The ACP is a trade bloc made up of 70 countries in the three regions. The
Courier, MarJApr. 1997, at xvi.
118. A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 200; ECHR, supra note 41.

119. A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 200.
120. Id at 201 (implicitly rejecting A's argument that the Commission's objective
was to avoid future costs).
121. Id

122. Id The CFH did not examine whether the restriction was proportionate to the
objective.
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The CFI then examined A's claim that the nature of the HIV test
was superfluous. The CFI determined that the medical officer's decision that such a test was necessary, or at least useful, constituted an
assessment of an exclusively medical nature and that as a medical
finding it was beyond the court's review."2 In addition, the court
stated that the medical officer may base his assessment of a candidate's fitness "not only on the existence of actual disorders but also on
a medically justified prognosis of future disorders capable of jeopardizing in the1 24foreseeable future the normal performance of the duties in
question."'
The CFI next addressed the issue of whether A's seropositivity
made him unfit for the post. The Commission argued that A was unfit
because he had gone beyond mere seropositivity to a condition of active illness. As a result, A's projected duties would be dangerous to
his health, since they would be in " 'high-risk countries', given the
dangers of infections and the lack of appropriate health-care infrastructures.' 1 25 A objected to the medical determination that his disease had gone beyond seropositivity and added that he had previously
worked in Mexico, a "developing countr[y] with only limited medical
infrastructures," further supporting his assertion that he was physically fit to work in the ACP region. 126 He also claimed that because
he was not symptomatic, the Commission violated the Council Conclusions, which state that
an asymptomatic employee should be
27
treated as fit for work.1
The CFI noted that the Conclusions were not provisions of Staff
Regulations or Community legislation and thus were not legally bind123. 1l at 202.

124. Id. at 206 (citing Miss M v. Commission and its decision in X v. Commission).
Miss M was a former Commission official who had successfully passed an entrance
exam and who underwent the requisite medical examination. Following a neuro-psychiatric exam, the medical officer concluded that Miss M was unfit for any secretarylevel post. Miss M argued, interalia, that the Commission may only consider physical
deficiencies when determining fitness for duty, not "psychical" or psychological disorders. The Commission disagreed. Case 155/78, Miss M v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
1797.
The ECJ held that the medical officer may take into account all relevant medical
criteria, including both physical and mental disorders to the extent that they "affect
the fulfillment by the candidate of his duties as an official." Id. at 1809. The Court
also stated that "it is even possible to envisage that a finding of unfitness may be
based not only on the existence of actual disorders but also on a medically justified
prognosis of future disorders capable of jeopardizing in the foreseeable future the
normal performance of the duties in question." I&L The ECJ found for Miss M on
other grounds. Id. at 1811-12 (annulling the Commission's decision of unfitness because it improperly withheld from the court information on the medical committee's
conduct in examining Miss M on confidentiality grounds despite Miss M's authorization of release).
125. A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 205.
126. Id. at 203.
127. l1& at 205-06; Conclusions, supra note 73, at 2.
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ing.128 Nonetheless, the CFI held that the Conclusions functioned as
rules of practice that should not be deviated from without full explanation.129 Although the CFI decided it could not alter a medical opinion, because it was a finding of fact, the court found it did have the
power to determine "whether there is a comprehensible link between
the medical findings . . . and the conclusion drawn" from those
findings. 30
The CFI found that the medical exam had revealed certain symptoms that would be classified as "symptomatic" of "associated infections.' 131 The CFI therefore concluded that there was a
comprehensible link between the medical findings and the conclusion
drawn regarding the candidate's fitness for duty, "particularly as those
duties were to be performed in developing countries where ... the
risks of infection are greater than in Europe." 132 The CF rejected A's
claim that he had worked in Mexico without any medical problems on
the grounds that Mexico is not an ACP country and that the medical
infrastructure in the ACP region is more rudimentary than Mexico's
system.'3 3 The CFE also determined that it was not necessary to decide whether the Commission had complied with the Conclusions because A was symptomatic and the Conclusions' provision regarding
fitness for work applies only to asymptomatic carriers. 13' Thus, the
CFI held that
A was not fit for duty because he had become
35
symptomatic.1
Accordingly, current E.C. case law indicates that the institutions
may subject a candidate to a medical exam, performing supplementary tests so long as they obtain the candidate's informed consent to
both the test and the implications the results might have on the candidate's recruitment."3 If the candidate refuses to submit to a test, the
medical officer may not perform related tests, but the institutions can
possibly reject the candidate based on his refusal.' 37 As discussed below, such a limitation hampers full protection of an individual's right
to privacy and violates the provisions of the ECHR's Article 8.1M
U.S. law, at least under its statutory protection, has better protected
an individual's right to privacy.
128. A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.Rt

at 205-06.

129. Id. at 205 (noting that the Commission "regards itself as bound by [the]
Conclusions").
130. Id. at 206.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 208. This case was not appealed to the ECJ.

136. Case 404/92, X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.Rt
137. Id.
138. See infra part III.B.2.

1-4737, 4790.
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UNITED STATES LAW

Like the European Community, the United States respects privacy
and protection of medical information. In addition, the United States
has implemented statutory provisions limiting the use of HIV testing
by employers and protecting workers from discrimination in the HIV/
AIDS context. Both the constitutional and statutory protection have
given rise to a growing body of case law.' 39
A. Foundationfor the Right to Privacy
Under U.S. law, an individual's right to privacy stems from three
main sources: the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Fourth Amendment protection from government intrusions, and statutory protection from public and private employers.
This part will discuss the constitutional rights and the establishment of
the respective balancing tests later used in the HIV/AIDS context.
1. Due Process Right to Privacy
While nothing in the U.S. Constitution specifically refers to an individual's right to privacy, the Supreme Court has derived a privacy
right from various constitutional sources.'Y0 In Griswold v. Connecticut,14 ' a majority of the Court recognized a set of "penumbral pri-

139. Roger Ricklefs, AIDS Cases Prompt a Host of Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Oct. 7,
1987, at 37 (stating that "day by day, the caseload grows").
140. See Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy (1995); Jon D.
Bible & Darien A. McWhirter, Privacy in the Workplace: A Guide for Human Resource Managers 33-54 (1990); AIDS Law Today: A New Guide for the Public 13134, (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1992); Richard C. Turkington et al., Privacy: Cases and
Materials (1992); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy," 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1289 (1981); G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Right of Privacy: Past, Present,and Future,16 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 403 (1989) (presenting extensive discussion on the right of privacy during the 25th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); David Crump, How Do the Courts Really
Discover UnenumeratedFundamentalRights? Cataloguingthe Methods ofJudicialAlchemy, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 795, 843-48 (1996) (discussing the derivation of
privacy rights from the text of the Constitution); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets,
and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional
Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (discussing the interest in disclosing personal information); Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the FourthAmendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations?, 29 Am. Bus. L.J. 625 (1992).
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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vacy" rights. 42 In Whalen v. Roe, 143 the Supreme Court characterized
the due process privacy right as involving at least two types of interests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and.., the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
1
important decisions."'"
The Supreme Court implied that the right to
private medical information falls under the former category.)4
Although the Court upheld the state statute requiring central recording of prescriptions and sales of dangerous drugs, the Court suggested
that government disclosure of a person's medical records might invade
a constitutional right to privacy.' 46 Several circuit courts have used
Whalen as a foundation for recognition of a qualified privacy right of
medical information.' 47
142. The Court based these rights on the First Amendment's freedom of association, the Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering of soldiers in any house,
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, the Ninth Amendment provision
that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people," and the Fourth and Fifth Amendment provisions regarding "protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' " I& at 483-84 (quoting the Ninth
Amendment and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630).
143. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See generally Turkington et al., supra note 140, at 59-60;
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 Cornell L Rev. 451, 495-97
(1995).
144. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
145. Il at 600.
146. See id. at 605-06 (noting that New York State law and possibly the Constitution require a duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures of personal information and at
least "evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in
privacy"); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
"strongest precedent in the Supreme Court for recognizing a constitutional right to
conceal one's medical history is Whalen v. Roe").
147. The Third Circuit was the first to affirm that an employee's medical records
are private and therefore are entitled to some degree of protection. United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving a government
agency's request for Westinghouse employees' medical records for the purpose of an
occupational health investigation). The court also held that this right is not absolute
and some intrusions may be justified where "the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the privacy interest on the specific facts of the case." Id. at 578. After taling
into account the public policy interests in the government's comprehensive statutory
scheme concerning occupational health and safety as well as its interest in conducting
a study to better this system, the instituted safeguards ensuring against nonconsensual
disclosure, and the fact that the employees' records primarily contained results from
routine medical tests, the Third Circuit ruled that Westinghouse's blanket refusal to
disclose to the government the information in their employees' medical files was unjustified. Id. at 580. Nevertheless, the court also noted that an individual employee
could raise a private action if he thought that his information was of such a sensitive
nature that it outweighed the federal agency's interest in its research. Id. at 581. The
court accordingly mandated a sufficient period of notice of disclosure so that the employee would have time to make this determination. Id. Other Circuits have cited
Westinghouse and Whalen as a basis for upholding a privacy right in medical information. See, eg., F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995); Doe v. City of
N.Y., 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th
Cir. 1994) (expressly rejecting this right).
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2. Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court uses a balancing test in Fourth Amendment
challenges to unreasonable searches, which employees have raised
when contesting blood tests in a variety of contexts, including HIV
screening in the workplace. 48
a. Fourth Amendment Privacy and Blood Testing
The Supreme Court has held that the "overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State."'1 49 In applying Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches in the workplace, the
Supreme Court uses a balancing test that weighs the nature and quality of "the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace."'
In Schmerber v. California,'5 ' the Court examined Fourth Amendment protection against involuntary blood testing.'5 1 Schmerber was
brought to the hospital following a car accident. The investigating police officer suspected Schmerber was under the influence of alcohol,
arrested him, and arranged for the hospital to take a blood sample. 5 3
The Supreme Court first stated that the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from "intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. ' 154 The Court
held that in the case of bodily intrusions, unless there is some clear
indication that evidence will be found, the individual's privacy interest
outweighs the risk that such evidence may disappear. 5 5 The Court
then determined that the officer could "reasonably have believed that
he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant ...

threatened 'the destruction of evidence,' " be-

cause the body eliminates alcohol from the bloodstream shortly after
148. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th
Cir. 1990); Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
149. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment
states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
150. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987).
151. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
152. Id. at 766.
153. Id. at 758.
154. Id. at 768.
155. Id. at 770.
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drinking stops.' 56 Lastly, the Court decided that the test chosen to
measure the level of alcohol in the blood was a reasonable one because blood tests are "commonplace" and that "for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain."' s While holding that the blood test was a justified invasion of privacy, the Court
also underlined that it reached a judgment only on the facts of the
case, as "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value
of our society."'15 8 Although the Supreme Court has not decided a
case directly on point, several circuit and district courts have addressed privacy and Fourth Amendment searches in the context of
HIV testing.
b.

FourthAmendment Privacy and HIV Testing

In Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Department of State,'1 59 an employee union challenged

the government's mandatory HIV testing policy as an unreasonable
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a substantive privacy right stemming from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
clause. 160 In November 1986, the State Department included an HIV
test in the list of routine blood tests given to all candidates and employees.1 61 As justification, the State Department argued that service
at many posts would pose a "serious hazard" to H1V-infected individuals, due to the insufficient level of medical care available to treat
IHIV-related problems and the "health and sanitary conditions" that
156. Id. at 770 (citations omitted). This is not a concern when testing for HIV, thus
an unauthorized search based on this premise alone would probably violate the
Fourth Amendment.
157. Id. at 771.
158. Id. at 770-72.
159. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
160. Id at 53. The union also claimed that the testing policy violated the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 53-54; see discussion infra note 227. Because the union represented
only some of the Foreign Service employees, the court took "cognizance of the possibility that plaintiff may lack organizational standing to represent its members[,] ...
recognizing the highly individualized nature of the problem and possible conflicts between Foreign Service employees or within their families." Id. at 55 (citations
omitted).
161. Id. at 52. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, which included a provision requiring the
discharge of all HIV-positive military personnel. The President opposed this provision, which is "blatantly discriminatory and highly punitive to service members and
their families." Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 260,260-61 (Feb. 19, 1996). On March 20,
1996, "the Senate unanimously supported repeal" of that provision. Retreatfrom HIV
Law: Senate: Repeal Discharge Policy, Newsday, Mar. 20, 1996, at A56. The House
also dropped the provision later in the year. Congress Kills Bill to Boot All with HIV
from Military, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 1, 1996, at A10, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
3715166.
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would be "particularly hazardous to carriers of the virus."' 62 HIVpositive individuals were barred from employment because
they "are
1' 63
impaired and medically unfit for worldwide service.'
The union argued that the testing program was unreasonable because many experts assert that "mandatory testing has little, if any,
impact on the spread of HIV-related disease." 64 Judge Gesell rejected this argument, finding the purpose of the testing policy to be
evaluation of fitness for duty, not prevention of HIV infection. 65 Because no additional taking of blood was necessary, presumably making the test reasonable at its inception, and because the tests were
conducted in a reasonable manner to protect privacy, the court found
that the HIV test was "rational and closely related to fitness for
duty."'1 66 The court also did not find any constitutional privacy issue
in the potential psychological impact of discovering the results of an
HIV test, particularly because other serious
diseases detectable by a
167
blood test may present similar concerns.
In contrast to Local 1812, the Eighth Circuit struck down a health
services agency's policy of testing its employees for HIV in Glover v.
Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation.168 A class of employees at the mental health institution claimed that the agency's policy violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches. The agency's purpose for the testing was ostensibly to protect clients engaging in violent behavior, including biting and scratching, from contracting HIV from a seropositive employee. 69 After
reviewing extensive evidence, the district court found that "[t]he medical evidence is undisputed that the disease is not contracted by casual
contact,' 170 noting that the risk of infection from scratching or biting
"is extraordinarily low,... approaching zero."' 171 Thus, the district
court found that "from a medical viewpoint, this policy is not necessary to protect clients from any medical risks."' 72 Based on these
findings, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conclusion that the agency's
162. Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 52; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text
(discussing a similar rationale in A v. Commission).
163. Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 52. The policy further stated that current symptomatic employees would be limited to domestic service, asymptomatic employees
would be eligible for service in those countries whose medical care was considered
adequate and where unusual health hazards were not present, and no employee
would be dismissed by a finding of HIV infection. Id.
164. Id. at 53.
165. ld. The court stated that the Fourth Amendment and due process privacy
claims are "closely related in their focus on the reasonableness of the testing program," and did not address them separately. Id.
166. Id.
167. IaM
168. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
169. Id.at 462-63.
170. Id.at 463
171. Idt
172. I&
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policy was unreasonable and did not justify an intrusion on its employees' Fourth Amendment rights. 73 The court added, however, that because of the severity of the disease at issue, it did not intend a "broadbased rule with regard to testing public employees for any infectious
disease, including AIDS."'174
In contrast to Glover, the Fifth Circuit found that a hospital's infection control policy requiring disclosure of test results did not constitute an unreasonable invasion of its employees' right to privacy. In
Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1,175 a
nurse was discharged for violating hospital policy when he refused to
submit the results of an HIV test he voluntarily underwent outside his
course of employment.1 76 The court dismissed Leckelt's claim that
forcing him to divulge the results violated his right to privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.'" Noting the hospital's detailed infection
control policies, the court found that Leckelt had a "diminished expectation of privacy in the results of his HIV antibody test."' 78 In
addition, the court considered the hospital's strong interest in protecting the health of its employees and patients by preventing the spread
of infectious diseases and the circumstances surrounding Leckelt himself, such as "his apparent homosexuality, medical condition,... longterm relationship with a man" who died from AIDS-related complications, and his duties as a licensed nurse which might provide for an
opportunity for transmission. 7 9 In applying the balancing test, the
court concluded that the hospital's interest "in maintaining a safe
workplace through infection control outweighed the limited intrusion
on any privacy interest Leckelt had in the results of his HIV antibody
test."180
B. Statutory Protectionof the Right to Privacy in the Workplace
Unlike the European Community, the United States has a comprehensive system of statutory law protecting disabled employees from
discrimination in the workplace. Both HIV seropositivity and AIDS
are now considered disabilities, and therefore benefit from protection
under two main acts: the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
1. The Statutory Provisions
The Rehabilitation Act was adopted in 1973 and was the first Act to
protect handicapped individuals from discrimination in the workplace.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id at 464.
Id.
909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id at 824.
Id. at 833.
Id
Id
Id.
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The ADA was adopted in 1990 and is similar to the Rehabilitation Act
except that it applies to private and municipal employers while the
Rehabilitation Act covers federal employers. The two statutes provide adequate protection in most instances from discrimination by
both public and private employers.
a. RehabilitationAct of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act 181 covers federal employers and contractors
as well as those receiving financial assistance from the federal government.'8 It provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... shall, solely by reason of ...his disability,

. . .

be sub-

jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or

.

. . conducted by any Executive

agency."'183 An individual with a disability may fall under any of three
categories: (a) one who has a physical impairment which substantially
limits any major life activity, (b) one who "has a record of such an
impairment," or (c) one who "is regarded as having such an impairment."'" The Rehabilitation Act also prohibits preemployment medical exams and inquiries into an applicant's disability, but does permit
inquiries into an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions.18 5
Thus, an HIV test, for example, would not be permitted unless the
employer could demonstrate that the results reflected the applicant's
ability to perform a job-related function.' 86
While the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically state that individuals with an infectious disease fall under its scope, the Supreme Court
has held that the Rehabilitation Act does in fact apply to such individuals. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,"87 a teacher who
suffered several relapses of tuberculosis was discharged by the school
board "solely on the basis of her illness."' 88 The Supreme Court
181. 29 U.S.C. § 701-797 (1994).
182. Laura F. Rothstein, Disability Law: Cases, Materials, Problems 71 (1995).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

184. § 706(8)(B). The Rehabilitation Act also requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to the disabled individual unless such accommodation would
cause undue hardship. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1995). Reasonable accommodation may

include making facilities more accessible or usable, job restructuring, modified work
schedules, or modification of equipment or devices. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b).
185. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a).
186. Young & Wells, supra note 21, at 53.

187. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). For further discussion of this case, see Michael E. Hilton,

Recent Developments, Civil Rights-RehabilitationAct of 1973-IndividualAffected
with Contagious Disease Held "Handicapped" and Entitled to Protection of Section
504 (29 U.S.C. § 794), 19 St. Mary's LJ.231 (1987); M.E. Lally-Green, Is AIDS a
Handicap Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973 After School Board v. Arline and the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987?, 19 U. Tol. L. Rev. 603 (1988); Gary Lawson,
AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards a Casual Interpretationof Section 504, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 237 (1989); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under Federal,
State, and Local Law After Arline, 15 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 221 (1987).
188. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
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found that Arline had a record of impairment and therefore qualified
as handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act.'8 9 The Supreme Court
rejected the school's argument that Arline was dismissed not because
of her physical capabilities, but because she posed a threat to the
health of others, 9 ' stating it would be unfair to allow an employer to

use "the distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient" to justify discrimination. 19' The
Court also found that such a distinction would defeat the purpose of
the Rehabilitation Act, which is to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not denied jobs simply because of the "prejudiced attitudes or
the ignorance of others."'192 Noting that to exclude such persons from
the Rehabilitation Act would be to deny them "the opportunity to
have their condition evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determination made as to whether they were 'otherwise qualified,' " the
Court concluded that a person with a record of a physical impairment
cannot be excluded from coverage solely because of his contagiousness. 9 3 Despite recognizing that "[flew aspects of a handicap give rise
to the same level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness,"' 94 and that the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is to replace
such reactions with "reasoned and medically sound judgments,"' the
Court still issued a disclaimer regarding the applicability of its judgment to IIIV/A-DS. 9 6

The Supreme Court then examined whether Arline was "otherwise
qualified" for the position of an elementary schoolteacher."9 The basic factors to consider were later codified in a federal regulation,
which states that an otherwise qualified person is one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
job."'198 The Court agreed with amicus American Medical Association
that the inquiry should include findings of fact about" '(a) the nature
of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk
(how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is
the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.' "19
189. Id at 281.
190. Id. at 281-82.
191. Id at 282.

192. Id. at 284.
193. Id at 285-86.
194. Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 285.
196. In a footnote, the Court said it was not addressing whether a person with HIV
could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether such a person could be
considered handicapped solely on the basis of his contagiousness. Id. at 282 n.7.
197. Id. at 287.
198. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1995).
199. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as
Amicus Curiae at 19).
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The Court further advised that "courts normally should defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of public health officials." 2"
Since the Court's decision, the Department of Justice 20 1 and most
courts2 02 have found both symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals
to be handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act despite their contagiousness. In September 1988, Congress amended the definition of a
handicapped individual to provide that the Rehabilitation Act does
not include an individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the
currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the
duties of the job. 03
200. Id
201. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195 (Oct. 7, 1988),
availablein Westlaw, BNA-DLR database, 195 DLR D-1, 1988 (finding symptomatic
carriers and asymptomatic carriers to be physically impaired; the former, because
their clinical symptoms have substantially limiting effects on major life activities, and
the latter, because either they are limited in their ability to procreate, or others who
know of their status will treat them in a way which will limit their activities).
202. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with
district court's assumption "that the HIV-infected prisoners are 'handicapped individuals' within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act"); Severino v. North
Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that
"[t]he contagiousness of the disease brings AIDS within the definition of a handicap,"
that others regarded this HIV-positive firefighter as handicapped, and that as a victim
of AIDS, he suffered an impairment of major life activities); Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 1990) (assuming "that seropositivity to HIV antibodies is an impairment" under the Rehabilitation Act); Doe v.
Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting "that it is well established that
infection with AIDS constitutes a handicap for purposes of the Act" in the case of an
asymptomatic HIV-infected Naval reserve member), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991);
Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that each of an
AIDS-afflicted, mentally handicapped child's conditions results in a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits a number of her major life activities);
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 704, 709 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that HIV is a contagious disease covered under the Act in the case of
an HIV-infected teacher who had been re-assigned to an administrative position);
Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that a
firefighter who was withdrawn from instatement due to his HIV status was an individual with a handicap "because he has a physical impairment that substantially limits
major life activities such as procreation, sexual contact, and normal social relationships"); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that infection
with HIV or AIDS is a handicap under the state analogue to the Rehabilitation Act);
Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 660 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding a
county employee with AIDS able to bring a claim under the Rehabilitation Act).
203. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D)
(1994)); see also Connolly & Marshall, supra note 20, at 567 (stating that the Department of Justice concluded that the Rehabilitation Act "protects all HIV-infected individuals, symptomatic or asymptomatic, who are not a direct threat to the health and
safety of others").
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Thus, people infected with HIV/AIDS do benefit from protection
under the Rehabilitation Act, provided they do not pose a "direct
threat" that cannot be eliminated by "reasonable accommodation."'" 4
b. Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Actzns prohibits any private or
public employer of fifteen or more employees 20 6 from discriminating
against a qualified individual on the basis of his disability." 7 The
ADA's definition of "disability' 208 and "qualified individual with a
disability"' ° are virtually the same as under the Rehabilitation Act. 210
"Discrimination" under the ADA, however, includes medical exams
and inquiries. 21 1 The ADA prohibits all pre-employment medical exams that determine whether an applicant has a disability or the nature
or severity of such a disability; 12 only inquiries into the candidate's
ability to perform job-related functions are permitted.-' Once an employer has made an offer of employment, it may require a medical
exam and even make the offer conditional on the results if: (1) all
offerees are subject to the exam and (2) the results are considered
confidential and maintained in separate medical files.214 Post-employment medical tests are prohibited unless the test is "job-related and
consistent with business necessity.''
An employer's qualification
standards may also require that an individual "not pose a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.'' 1 6 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") implementing regulationse-' list factors to consider when determining
204. See infra part II.B.2.
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
206. § 12111(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (1996).
207. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4. The federal government and corporations wholly owned
by the federal government are excluded from the scope of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(B)(i).
208. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
209. § 1630.2(m).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(k)(1).

211. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1). The EEOC's regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act cover medical exams less extensively than the ADA provisions. See 45
C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1996).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
213. § 12112(d)(2)(B).

214. § 12112(d)(3). If the tests "screen out an employee ...with [a disability] ...

the exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
and performance of the essential job functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1996).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Voluntary medical exams may be offered provided the information is kept confidential and maintained in separate files.
§ 12112(d)(4)(B)-(C).
216. § 12113(b).
217. The ADA grants the EEOC authority to issue implementing regulations and
develop procedures to handle administrative claims. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(1), 12116,
12117(b). The ADA also gives the EEOC the power to prevent unlawful employment
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whether an individual poses a direct threat are listed,218 and are virtually the same as the criteria the Supreme Court identified in Arline.219
The regulations also state that the assessment should be based on "a
reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge."" 0 Finally, as under the Rehabilitation Act, 22 the employer must attempt to make reasonable accommodation, such as job
restructuring, modified work schedules, or reassignment to a vacant
position, in order to assist the disabled individual in performing the
essential functions of the job.'
Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA does not refer to HIV in any
of its provisions. The EEOC, however, stated in its interpretive guidelines that HIV infection is "inherently substantially limiting 2 2 3 and
therefore is covered under the ADA. Four circuit courts2 4 and several district courtsz22 have also found IHIV seropositivity to be a disability under the ADA.
Based on the case law discussed above and the EEOC guidelines

implementing the ADA, HIV seropositivity is a handicap under both
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Hence, qualifying private or
public employers may not require an HIV test as a prerequisite of
employment unless they can show that it is related to the candidate's
ability to do the job.

6

practices, bring a civil action for such practices, and investigate any charges fied.
§§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8.
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (including duration of the risk, nature and severity of
potential harm, likelihood that harm will occur and imminence of the potential harm).
219. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
221. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12.
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
223. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i) at 402.
224. Abbott v. Bragdon, No. 96-1643, 1997 WL 85096, at *2 (1st Cir. Mar. 5, 1997);
Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
that HIV seropositivity is not a per se disability because the statute requires "case-bycase determinations of whether a given impairment substantially limits a major life
activity, whether an individual has a record of such a substantially limiting impairment, or whether an individual is being perceived as having such a substantially limiting impairment"); Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265,
1267 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding, however, that Doe, a resident neurosurgeon, was not
otherwise qualified since he posed a significant risk to his patients' health that could
not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439,
1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no distinction between asymptomatic and symptomatic
HIV carriers and holding that the "regulations implementing the ADA include, as a
physical or medical impairment, 'HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)' ") (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(4)(1)(ii) (1994)). For further discussion of Doe,
see infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
225. Dean v. Knowles, 912 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (finding HIV seropositivity a disability under the ADA since it is a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act and the standards of the Rehabilitation Act are applicable to cases under the
ADA); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.N.J. 1995) (stating that an individual
is, "by virtue of his HIV status, a person with a disability" under the ADA).
226. Young & Wells, supra note 21, at 53.
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2. Cases Under the Acts
Several courts evaluating challenges under the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA have addressed whether seropositive individuals pose a
"direct threat" and therefore are not "otherwise qualified."'-'- This
section first discusses cases involving casual contact, and then examines cases involving health care workers ("HCWs") in which the Acts
have been applied differently.
a. Cases Involving Casual Contact
22 the Ninth
In Chalk v. Orange County Superintendent of Schools,1
Circuit held that HIV was a contagious disease covered under the Rehabilitation Act in the case of an HIV-infected teacher who had been
re-assigned to an administrative position. 2 9 The district court had applied Arline's four criteria, finding the probability of harm minimal,
the duration of the risk long, the severity fatal, but transmission highly
unlikely. 30 The district court concluded that the consequences of the
possibility of a risk were too great to ignore and denied the teacher's
motion for preliminary injunction, reinstating him to classroom duties.23 ' The Ninth Circuit criticized the lower court's skepticism about
the current state of medical knowledge, to which Arline specifically
says deference should be granted, and held, after examining all the
medical evidence indicating extremely low risk, that the 1fV-positive
schoolteacher was otherwise qualified. 2
The D.C. district court in Doe v. District of Columbia233 also applied the Arline criteria to examine whether an HIV-positive
firefighter would "pose a 'direct threat' to the health or safety of
others.'- 3 The court found that there was no measurable risk of
transmission in the case of a firefighter and noted that one medical
expert "compared the risk to that of being struck by a meteor."'- 35
The court also found that because the "risk of transmission [is] ex-

227. Prior to the inclusion of the "direct threat" provision in the Rehabilitation
Act, the Local 1812 court addressed the employee union's claim that asymptomatic
individuals are "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act. Local 1812,
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50
(D.D.C. 1987). The court summarily rejected the union's claim, stating that the "Act
does not require the Department of State to ignore the obvious relevance of HIV
infection to its qualification of Foreign Service employees for long terms of worldwide
duty abroad." Id. at 54. The court further found that "the record is devoid of any
purpose or intention to discriminate." Id.
228. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988).
229. Id at 704-09.
230. Id at 707.
231. Id

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id at 709.
796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992).
Id. at 568.
Id at 568-69.
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tremely remote, the duration and severity of the risk warrant little
weight by the [c]ourt. '236 By taking into account medical testimony,
the court concluded that the risk of transmission was so small that
Doe's HIV seropositivity did not make him a direct threat to his colleagues or to the public.237
Similarly, in EEOC v. Dolphin CruiseLine, Inc.,238 a Florida district
court held that an HIV-positive entertainer, Sievers, did not pose a
"direct threat" to others.2 39 Dolphin rescinded an offer of employment when the results of Sievers's mandatory HIV test indicated he
was seropositive.24° Dolphin argued that "allowing Sievers to work on
the ship... 'pose[s] a significant risk of harm to himself and to others'
because he is HIV positive."'
The court rejected this argument,
finding Sievers did not pose a significant risk of harm because current
medical opinion maintains that HIV cannot be transmitted through
casual contact and because defendants "failed to demonstrate, by
other than speculation and stereotyping, that the health risk posed by
Sievers in the particular work environment was significant." 42
One court took issue with the EEOC's interpretation of "direct
threat" in its regulations implementing the ADA. An Illinois district
court concluded in a Memorandum Opinion and Order that the
EEOC's interpretation was "untenable," because "the ADA clearly
and unambiguously refers to 'a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace,' " not to himself and to others. 3
The court found that the EEOC's reading would make certain words
in the statute superfluous, contrary to the law of statutory interpretation.24" In making this observation, the court raised an interesting
point upon which both Local 18125 and A v. Commission246 relied
when they made findings of unfitness for duty based on the work envi236. Id at 569.
237. Id
238. 945 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
239. Id at 1555.
240. Id at 1552-53.
241. Id. at 1554 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Oddly, the EEOC did
not challenge Dolphin's mandatory testing policy nor the inclusion of an HIV test in
the medical exam.
242. Id at 1555. Defendants recently settled the case, a development deemed important by the EEOC " 'because it says that an employer cannot assume that someone who is HIV positive is going to be a direct threat in the workplace.' "Entertainer,
Denied Job Because He Has HIV, Settles Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1996, at A15
(quoting Peggy Mastroianni, associate legal counsel for the EEOC).
243. Kohnke v. Delta Airlines Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The
EEOC's regulations define "direct threat" as "a significant risk of substantial harm to
the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced
by reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996).
244. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1111-12.

245. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
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ronment's threat to the health of the afflicted individuals rather than
the threat the individuals' posed to others.
b.

"Direct Threat" and Health Care Workers

Many courts examine the "direct threat" question differently in
cases involving HCWs. Following the news story of Kimberly Bergalis
and four others who were presumably infected with HIV by their dentist, David Acer, the CDC adopted guidelines on HIV testing and
HCWs ("CDC Guidelines").2A7 The CDC recommended adherence
to universal precautions such as the use of protective barriers and voluntary HIV testing of HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures.'
The CDC Guidelines note that "[c]urrently available data
provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of
HCWs infected with IV... who perform invasive procedures not
identified as exposure-prone," and specifically do not recommend
mandatory testing.' 49 They also state that medical institutions should
identify which procedures are exposure-prone and should establish an
expert review panel that will decide on a case-by-case basis whether
seropositive HCWs should continue such procedures.'
Patient consent is also suggested." s Thus, using the CDC Guidelines as current
medical opinion, a court might weigh a public medical institution's interest in protecting health more heavily than an employee's right to
privacy where the individual in question is performing exposure-prone
invasive medical procedures.
In a case involving a HCW, the Fifth Circuit held in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Centerm' that an HIV-positive
surgical technician was not otherwise qualified due to the "cognizable
risk of permanent duration with lethal consequences.' ' " The court
focused on the probability of transmission given Bradley's duties and
found that "[w]hile the risk is small, it is not so low as to nullify the
catastrophic consequences of an accident."'' - Some courts have considered any risk of transmission too significant, such as the Fourth Circuit in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp., 5 a case
247. Robert J. Fitzgibbon, AIDS: Medical Groups Balk at Naming High-Risk Procedures, Medical Laboratory Observer, Oct. 1, 1991, at 9, available in Westlaw, 1991
WL 2965612. See generally Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-ProneInvasive
Procedures,40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1 (July 12, 1991) [hereinafter HCW
Guidelines] (recommending practices for HCWs in light of HIV/AIDS).
248. HCW Guidelines, supra note 247, at 4.
249. Il
250. IL
251. ld.
252. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994).
253. Id. at 924.
254. Id.
255. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
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involving a former resident in neurosurgery. The court held that Dr.
Doe was not otherwise qualified because "even if [he] takes extra precautions ... some measure of risk will always exist because of the type
'
of activities in which Dr. Doe is engaged."256
The Leckelt case also concerned a HCW who submitted a Rehabilitation Act claim. 25 7 In considering risk of transmission, the court
found that "[e]ven though the probability that a [HCW] will transmit
HIV to a patient may be extremely low and can be further minimized
through the use of universal precautions ... the potential harm of
HIV infection is extremely high." 258 In other cases a seropositive surgeon259 and a surgical technician2 60 were also found not otherwise
qualified due to the risk of transmission, however slight.
In sum, under U.S. constitutional protections, an employer may test
candidates for HIV to determine fitness for duty and reject seropositive candidates for jobs that might endanger their health.2 6 ' In addition, in certain instances employers may test candidates in order to
protect the health of others.2 62 Under the statutory provisions, employers may not reject candidates on the basis of seropositivity unless
they can demonstrate that the illness affects the candidates' ability to
do the job.2 63 Courts must take into account Arline's criteria, but
often find, however, that HCWs pose a "direct threat" due to a perceived risk of transmission. 2 4
III.

EVALUATION OF THE

E.C.

AND U.S. SYSTEMS

As a whole, U.S. law is more fully developed in the area of protection of HIV-infected workers than E.C. law, having adopted statutory
protection to supplement its traditional constitutional protections.
256. Id. at 1266.
257. This case is also discussed in part III.B.L.a infra, dealing with the Fourth
Amendment claim.
258. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 829 (5th Cir.
1990).
259. Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that a surgeon was not otherwise qualified as his seropositivity posed a direct threat to
patients).
260. Mauro v. Borgess Medical Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (W.D. Mich. 1995)
(stating that "[b]ecause there is a real possibility of transmission, however small, and
because the consequence of transmission is invariably death, the threat to patient
safety posed by plaintiff's presence in the operating room performing the functions of
a surgical technician is direct and significant").
261. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State,
662 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1987); see supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
262. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d 820; supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1996).
264. Doe v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir.

1995); Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994); Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 829-30; Mauro, 886
F. Supp. at 1352-53; Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 772 (E.D. Pa.

1994); see supra part II.B.2.b.
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Both systems have protected the individual's right to privacy in certain
cases, but neither has protected privacy to the extent actually guaranteed by the respective frameworks. This part evaluates the two regions' tests and analyzes the application of those tests in the HIV
context. This part concludes with recommendations for both the
United States and the European Community.
A. The Balancing Tests
The European Community and the United States have similar systems for protecting the rights of privacy and the protection of medical
information. Both regions use a balancing test, weighing the intrusion
on the individual's privacy against the governmental interest served;
however, the criteria to consider in balancing the two interests are
particular to each test. In the European Community, the ECJ must
ensure that the restriction on a privacy right actually promotes the
public objective and is proportionate to its aim.26 The United States
has three balancing tests, reflecting Due Process, Fourth Amendment,
and statutory protection, and thus three sets of criteria. When evaluating the due process privacy right, courts should examine specifically
whether the measure is"'achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' ,,216
Fourth Amendment protection mandates that the individual's expectation of privacy, as well as the nature and inception of the search, be
reasonable, and courts applying the test under the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA must consider the Arline criteria, codified in the
EEOC's implementing regulations. 267 To date, both regions' courts
have recognized similar government objectives as legitimate: the protection of health and determination of fitness for duty. In balancing
these interests against the individual's right to privacy, the United
States more consistently guarantees the right to privacy, although
problems remain in the context of HCWs.
B. Application of the Tests
At first glance, both the U.S. and E.C. tests appear to protect adequately an individual's right to privacy in the context of HIV/AIDS.
In evaluating the tests' various criteria, however, courts have differed
in the extent of protection actually guaranteed to workers. While
there have been more cases handled in the United States than those
involving the E.C. institutions, the two judicial systems have applied
their respective tests to similar cases yielding comparable results.
265. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
266. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citations omitted).
267. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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1. U.S. Cases
Individuals alleging an invasion of privacy often plead violations of
both the constitutional and statutory schemes. In cases regarding HIV
testing in the employment context, courts have better guaranteed protection under the statutory scheme, with the exception of cases involving HCWs.
a. Fourth Amendment Cases
Only one court has upheld Fourth Amendment privacy protection,
examining risk of transmission as a factor when evaluating the individual's privacy interest. In other cases, courts have substituted fear and
paternalism for rational medical opinion, finding that the individual's
right to privacy did not outweigh the government's interest.
In Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Departmentof State,268 the court held that the State Department's HIV testing policy did not constitute an invasion of the
employees' privacy, taking a paternalistic approach by accepting that
seropositive individuals are not qualified for overseas positions because they might endanger their health.269 The court first addressed
the two constitutional claims of the employee union together2 70 and
then discussed the union's statutory claim.27 ' The court's decision
turned on its determination that the purpose of the government's HIV
testing policy was to assess fitness for duty, a legitimate objective,
rather than to prevent HIV infection. The district court admitted that
screening was not a valid method of preventing the spread of AIDS,
implying testing would not serve the objective of protection of health
of the candidate's colleagues, but found that the State Department's
testing program was rational and closely related to the stated
purpose.272
The court cited the dangers HIV-infected employees would face in
countries whose medical facilities might be less sophisticated than
those in the United States or whose staff might be less familiar with
AIDS, and the possibility of increased medical risk that employees
would face when stationed worldwide for long periods of time.273
These are issues that any individual would weigh, whether they are
HIV-positive or not, when deciding whether to accept an overseas po268. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); see supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
269. 662 F. Supp. at 53.

270. The union alleged a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the substan-

tive privacy right stemming from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
271. See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text for discussion of the Rehabilita-

tion Act claim.

272. Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 53.

273. Id.
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sition, and require personal judgment.2 74 The court seemed to accept
that an employer should be in the position to make such decisions on
behalf of its seropositive employees, a paternalistic approach that
should be reconsidered.
While the government could have argued that the cost of replacing
an HIV-positive candidate who becomes ill on the job makes that candidate unfit for duty, it did not present any argument that the risk of
having to replace HIV-positive candidates is significantly higher than
for other candidates to justify their discriminatory policy.2 5 Risks are
associated with most jobs, and applicants must weigh them against the
benefits of the position they seek. 276 Neither the court nor the government should be involved to the extent that the individual is no
longer able to exercise his personal judgment. 2'
Such a paternalistic approach effectively permits discrimination
against HIV-infected individuals while masking the negative results
with a beneficent appearance. This magnanimous rule-making is in
stark contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court's identification of a privacy
interest in independence in deciding personal matters, one of the two
274. See generally Other Facets of Remote Medicine, Oil & Gas J., Apr. 29, 1996, at
47 (discussing the risks travellers and expatriates face at "remote sites"); Alan Kline,
Concentra Wants to Know if Workers Have Their Shots, Baltimore Bus. J., Oct. 4-10,
1996, at 10 (describing a company which helps prepare employees for overseas
travel); Alan Pike, Callfor Company Crisis Plansfor Overseas Staff, Fin. Times, Sept.
27, 1990, at 8 (listing Africa as the "toughest overseas location, followed by the Far
East" due to its "poor health facilities").
275. See Local 1812, 662 F. Supp. at 52-53.
276. "[-Iealth care and social service workers are disproportionately affected by
job-related violence," facing an incidence rate of "47 cases per 10,000 workers for
residential care settings, and 38 cases per 10,000 workers for nursing and personal
care facilities," compared with 3 cases per 10,000 workers for the private industry.
Health Care: OSHA Releases Non-Mandatory Guidelinesfor Health Car4 Social Service Employers, O.S.H. Daily (BNA), at d2 (Mar. 15, 1996), available in Vestlaw,
BNA-OSHD database, 3/15/96 OSD d2; see also Ellen I. Carni, Stress and Productivity: For Better or Worse, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 26, 1996, at 5 (reporting that attorneys are
twice as likely to suffer from clinical depression than the general population); Laura
Meckler, Cab Driver Leads National List of Dangerous Jobs, Los Angeles Daily
News, July 9, 1996, at B2, available in Westlaw, 1996 WVL 6565197 (describing workplace violence for taxi drivers and retail workers); NIOSH, OSHA Conference Focuses on Musculoskeletal Injuries, Bus. Ins., Jan. 27, 1997, at 13 (reporting on a
seminar on the ergonomic risks at workplaces like offices, factories, construction sites,
and farms); Julie-Anne Ryan, Good Health at the Office, The Tunes (London), May 9,
1996, at 14 (describing occupational health as a way to combat workplace health risks
to employees); Peter Busowski, Stress: American Workers Face "77me Crunch" Reducing Job Performanceand Satisfaction, Empl.Pol'y & L Daily (BNA), at d9 (Jan. 9.
1997), availablein Westlaw, BNA-EPLD database, 1191197 EPLD d9 [hereinafter Time
Crunch] (categorizing the high levels of stress faced by workers in high-performance
workplaces as a problem).
277. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practiceof Autonomy 6 (1988) (equating
autonomy with "dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and
self-knowledge"); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: MoralIdeals in
the Constitution?, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 445, 446-90 (1983) (describing different
notions of privacy).
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privacy interests recognized in Whalen v. Roe.278 To hold that an employer may decide for the employee that the risks of a given position
are too high goes beyond the determination of whether the employee
is fit for duty and approaches the issue of whether the employee 279
is
willing to accept the risk of the duties involved, a personal decision.
The court should have recognized that protection of the individual's
own health does not outweigh his interest in autonomy, an interest
that is central to an individual's sense of dignity."'
Another troubling aspect of the fitness determination in Local 1812
is the court's consideration of the likelihood of future illness. The district court took into account that the majority of HIV-infected individuals develop AIDS or AIDS-related complex.2 8 ' While most
seropositive individuals do eventually develop AIDS-related complex,
they are not the only employees who face future illnesses. Smokers,28 2 overweight or obese people,28 3 even people who do not exercise, 28' also run a higher risk of future illness than the average
278. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
279. Two commentators agree with the courts, stating that "[i]f the work environment were a place which was unusually rich in such infections or malignancies such
employees would not be otherwise qualified for that job." Connolly & Marshall, supra
note 20, at 571.
280. See Dworkin, supra note 277, at 6 (stating that autonomy is often associated
with dignity).
281. Local 1812, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of
State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.D.C. 1987).
282. Lewis Cope, The Risks of Smoking, Chi. Trib., May 25, 1993, at 11 (listing the
health dangers for which smokers have an increased risk of contracting).
[Gpigar smokers have 4 to 10 times the risk of dying from laryngeal, oral and
esophageal cancers as nonsmokers. Overall cancer death rates among men
who smoke cigars are 34 percent higher than cancer death rates among nonsmokers. Men who smoke five or more cigars a day are two to three times
more likely to die of lung cancer than nonsmokers.
Erin Hoover, Potential Health Danger Hides in Trendy Smoke of Cigar Craze, The
Oregonian (Portland), Feb. 13, 1997, at El; see also Smoking: Supreme Court Refuses
to Hear Smokers Screened from Job Interviews in Florida,Empl. Pol'y & L. Daily
(BNA), at d2 (Jan. 11, 1996), available in Westlaw, BNA-EPLD database, 1/11/96
EPLD d2 (discussing a case in which the city of North Miami argued that "employees
who use tobacco cost as much as $4,611 per year more than nonsmokers").
283. "Health risks related to obesity include coronary heart disease.... diabetes,
and [certain] cancers." In addition, "[o]besity-related medical conditions are the second leading cause of death in America (after smoking-related illnesses), resulting in
300,000 lives lost each year." Position of the American Dietetic Association: Weight
Management, 97 J. Am. Dietetic Ass'n, Jan. 1997, at 71; see C. Everett Koop, M.D.,
Disease Prevention Through Weight Loss, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1997 (Letters to the Editor), at A13 ("In the past, doctors treated the health risks associated with obesitydiabetes, cardiovascular disease, high cholesterol. But now, doctors are treating obesity in order to prevent the development of these related risks.").
284. David Steen, Invest in a Healthy Future by Staying Fit, The Toronto Star, Feb.
13, 1997, at B12, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 3821394 (stating that "[p]eople who
don't exercise face the same health risks as those who smoke a pack of cigarettes a
day," including heart disease, diabetes, and respiratory illness).
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person.2 5 The right to privacy of seropositive employees should not
be outweighed by future costs solely because of society's general fear
of HIV/AIDS and the moral judgments attached to some of the
modes of transmission.
In addition to fitness for duty, U.S. courts have also recognized the
protection of health as a legitimate government objective. In Glover
v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation,28s the public
health institution asserted that its HIV testing policy served this objective.287 The court recognized the agency's interest in providing a safe
training and living environment for its clients, but still found for the
employees.3 Similarly, in Leckelt,289 the Fifth Circuit recognized a
hospital's strong interest in a safe and efficient workplace and in the
protection of health of its employees and patients; in this case, however, the court found that the invasion of the nurse's privacy was justified. 29° The Glover court evaluated the risk of transmission as an
important consideration while the Leckelt court did not seem to place
much weight on the low risk.29 1 The Glover court found that the "risk
of disease transmission has been shown to be negligible in [this] environment... [thus the government's] articulated interest in requiring
testing does not constitutionally justify" the protection of health objective. 292 The Leckelt court, however, focused primarily on Leckelt's
expectation of privacy while assuming that the transmission risk was
grave enough to warrant an invasion of privacy. Although Leckelt did
not address the issue, the difference in Leckelt's duties from those of
the employees in Glover may have added to the weight of the medical
institution's interest.293
Leckelt mentioned Glover in a footnote, stating that the facts of the
two cases were "materially different," because the testing in Glover
was "much broader" than that in Leckelt and because Leckelt was "a
285. See generally Dr. Hugh Stallworth, Controlling Risk Factors Can Reduce
Chance of Heart Attack, Orange County Register, July 19, 1996, at E3, available in
Westlaw, 1996 WL 7037307 (discussing the health risks associated with smoking, obesity, physical inactivity, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol).
286. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); supra notes 168-74
and accompanying text.
287. Glover, 867 F.2d at 462-63.
288. Id at 464.
289. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.
1990).
290. Id at 833.
291. The Leckelt court did consider risk of transmission in its discussion of the Rehabilitation Act. See id.at 829; supra text accompanying note 258.
292. Glover, 867 F.2d at 464.
293. Due to the severity of HIV infection and the fact that there is currently no
cure for AIDS, the argument has been made that individuals who perform invasive
medical procedures should notify their employers of HIV seropositivity, or at least
after they pass the stage of mere seropositivity. This type of examination arises most
often in statutory cases involving health care workers, when the courts must determine whether the individual poses a "direct threat" to others. See infra part llI.B.l.b.
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case of particularized, reasonable suspicion as to a specific individual,"
rather than a policy of testing all employees. 294 This distinction is not
very persuasive given that the issue in each case was the extent of the
invasion of the employee's privacy right compared with the government's need to promote legitimate interests. In both Leckelt and
Glover, the governmental interest was the protection of health of the
medical institutions' patients. The real distinction was that in Leckelt,
the privacy interest concerned the disclosure of test results to which
Leckelt independently submitted, 295 not a mandatory testing policy instituted by the employer like in Glover.2 96 This difference may be a
better justification for the court's judgment than the superficial difference of the broadness of testing. Violation of one individual's privacy
because of suspicions about his lifestyle is no better than a blanket
invasion of privacy of all employees.
Thus, under Fourth Amendment protection, only in one instance
has a court upheld an individual's right to privacy in the context of
HIV testing. Although the results are discouraging, statutory enactments discussed in the next section have provided a better guarantee
to HIV-positive workers.
b. Statutory Cases
Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA protect from discrimination "otherwise qualified" individuals with disabilities.297 Risk of
transmission should play an integral role in the evaluation of whether
a candidate is "otherwise qualified" because in the case of an individual with an infectious disease, the Acts provide that he will not be
"otherwise qualified" if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate
any "direct threat" to the health of others.298 Courts have accorded
different weight to current medical opinion regarding the risk of HIV
transmission when examining the four Arline criteria, often depending
on whether the case involves casual contact or HCWs.29 9
In Chalk v. United States District Court Central District of California,3 ° ° the Ninth Circuit criticized the district court's skepticism of the
medical community's knowledge of AIDS, particularly because to
hold otherwise would be to require the impossible standard of scientific certainty. 30 1 The court gave significant weight to the medical
community's view that there was an extremely low risk of transmis294. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 833 n.23.
295. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
296. Glover, 867 F.2d at 462.
297. See supra notes 183, 207 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 203, 216 and accompanying text.
299. The criteria are: nature, duration, and severity of the risk, and the probability
of transmission. Courts are further instructed to defer to reasonable medical opinion.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
300. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
301. 840 F.2d at 707-08.
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sion when determining whether the HIV-positive schoolteacher was
otherwise qualified.30 2 Similarly, in EEOC v. Dolphin Cruise Line,
Inc.,3 0 3 the court found that because HIV cannot be transmitted
through casual contact and because "the risk of HIV transmission in
an employment setting is remote," 3" the HIV-positive employee was
"otherwise qualified."
In Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
United States Department of State,305 a case also involving casual conduct, the court did not consider the low risk of transmission.
Although the union charged that the testing policy violated the Rehabilitation Act, the court never addressed Arline's criteria and therefore the issue of risk of transmission. This is puzzling because Arline
was decided six weeks before Local 1812. Possibly, the court did not
see the relevance of Arline's holding to a case involving HIV-infected
employees since the Arline Court issued a disclaimer regarding the
issue of HIV and AIDS under the Rehabilitation Act.306 Still, the Local 1812 court should have evaluated seropositive employees' fitness
for duty by taking into account the low risk of transmission in casual
contact work environments, rather than simply concluding that "[i]t
does not appear.., that HIV-infected persons are 'otherwise qualified' for worldwide Foreign Service duty. "307
Many courts weigh risk of transmission differently in the HCW context. For example, in Leckelt, the court found that the nurse was not
"otherwise qualified," because "at least some of [Leckelt's] duties
3 s
provided potential opportunities for HIV transmission to patients."
While it would appear that the court relied on current medical opinion,3" 9 the Leckelt court itself noted that "none of Leckelt's duties apparently fell within the technical definition of an invasive
procedure. '310 The CDC Guidelines clearly state that HCWs who do
not perform exposure-prone invasive procedures and who adhere to
302. Id

303. 945 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1996); supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
304. 945 F. Supp. at 1555; see also Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559,
569 (D.D.C. 1992) (joining "other courts that have refused to regard the theoretical or
remote possibility of transmission of HIV as a basis for excluding HIV-infected persons from employment or educational opportunities"). But see Anonymous Fireman
v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402,412 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that the City's
mandatory HIV testing policy for firefighters and paramedics was not an unreasonable search since they are "at a higher risk than persons in hospitals for contracting or
transmitting the HIV virus").
305. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.

306. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
307. 662 F. Supp. at 54.
308. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 829 (5th Cir.
1990).
309. Id
310. Id.
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universal precautions pose no risk for HIV transmission;31 ' thus, the
Leckelt court did not properly follow Arline's criteria. 12
In Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.,13 an expert panel reviewed the issue of Dr. Doe's seropositivity in accordance with the CDC Guidelines and recommended that he be allowed
to return to practice with certain exceptions. 1 4 The hospital administrators, however, decided in their own wisdom to "err on the side of
caution ' 315 and suspended Dr. Doe permanently.316 The Fourth Circuit upheld this decision, putting its own evaluation of the risk of
transmission over the medical experts' recommendation. This approach is not consistent with Arline, in which the Supreme Court specifically instructed courts to defer to medical opinion. 17 In addition,
the court defeated its own purpose of protecting the health of patients
would discourage other HIV-positive HCWs
by taking action that 318
forward.
coming
from
Instead of the Arline criteria, courts seem to have taken into account public paranoia and ignorance. Studies show that 80-90% of
the U.S. public say they want to know their HCWs' HIV status and
that more than half would choose not to be treated by an HIV-infected surgeon or dentist.31 9 The medical reality, however, is revealed
by another study showing that out of 19,000 patients operated on by
311. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
312. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d. at 829.
313. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
314. Id at 1266.
315. Id
316. Id at 1262-63. The hospital may have taken other issues into account, such as
liability. Liability in the area of AIDS law can fall under: (1) tort law, such as wrongful death actions and infliction of emotional distress, see Marchica v. Long Island
R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 451-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994)
(surveying state cases addressing whether "fear of AIDS" is a viable cause of action);
Joseph Loparco, Note, Marchica v. Long Island R.R.: "AIDS-Phobia" Recovery
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 15 Pace L. Rev. 575 (1995) (discussing
both courts' decisions as well as common law developments in the area of AIDSphobia); (2) employment discrimination, see infra part II.B; and (3) criminal law, see
Lori A. David, The Legal Ramifications in Criminal Law of Knowingly Transmitting
AIDS, 19 Law & Psychol. Rev. 259 (1995); Michael L. Closen et al., Discussion,
Criminalizationof an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and CriminalExposure Laws, 46 Ark. L.
Rev. 921 (1994) (discussing prosecutions under traditional criminal statutes as well as
HIV-specific statutes); see also John R. Austin, HIVIAIDS and Health Care Industry
Liability: An Annotated Bibliography,27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 513 (1994) (presenting a
bibliography of AIDS/HIV liability in the health care industry).
317. 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1986).
318. Symposium, Job Restrictions and Disclosure Requirements for HIV-Infected
Health Care Professionals: Whose Privacy Is It Anyway?, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 5,
22-23 (1996) [hereinafter Symposium].
319. Id at 29. Closen argues that the medical evidence overwhelmingly supports
the conclusion that a genuine and serious risk of HIV transmission from surgeons/
dentists to their patients exists during the course of invasive procedures (referring to
HCWs' testimony in various cases that needle-sticks occur during invasive procedures
and that not all HCWs observe barrier precautions all of the time). Id.
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known HIV-positive surgeons, only 92 were found "to be HIV-infected, but the evidence did not support transmission from
[HCWs]."320 In addition, the CDC calculated the odds of HIV transmission from HCW to patient and, using rates of transmission from
patients to HCWs, estimated that the risk is "between 1 in 42,000 and
1 in 420,000,... less than the risk of mortality due to general anesthesia."'32 ' Medical opinion today clearly indicates that the risk of HIV
transmission from most HCWs is minuscule. 322 Despite the admittedly terrifying threat of the disease itself, the law requires courts to
be objective when evaluating these cases and to rely on experts who
can accurately assess the risks involved.323
In sum, courts have generally been successful in eliminating from
the balancing test the unfounded fear and paranoia of AIDS transmission from casual contact. Courts should do the same in the medical
field. After all, if courts would take into account the CDC Guidelines
and current public health opinion when reviewing the direct threat of
a HCW, only those HCWs who actually pose a significant risk would
be affected. Courts would thereby maintain a safe workplace and still
protect HIV-infected HCWs from blanket discrimination. 324
2. E.C. Cases
Although the ECJ upheld a candidate's right to privacy, this protection was undermined when the Court suggested that the institutions
could reject candidates who refuse to submit to an HIV test. In A v.
Commission,' the CFI did not uphold the candidate's right to privacy and took a paternalistic approach to justify the invasion. Both
decisions violate the spirit of the privacy protection extended in the
ECHR's Article 8 and the Conclusions dealing with AIDS and the
workplace.
In X v. Commission,' 6 the Advocate General, similar to the courts
in Leckelt327 and Glover,32 8 recognized the objective of protection of
320. Id. at 19, n.73.
321. Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Health Care Workers with the Human inmunodeficiency Virus: The Next Steps, 267 JAMA 1100, 1100 (1992).

322. Most of the opposing arguments are based on an analogy to Hepatitis, which is
similar to HIV except that HIV is much more "difficult to transmit compared to other
similar bloodborne viruses." Symposium, supra note 318, at 21.
323. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).

324. American Bar Association AIDS Coordinating Committee, Calming AIDS
Phobia: Legal Implications of the Low Risk of Transmitting HIV in the Health Care

Setting, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 733, 748-49 (1995).
325. Case 10/93, 1994 E.C.R. II-179 (Ct. First Instance).
326. Case 404/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737.
327. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir.
1990); supra note 179 and accompanying text.

328. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 46263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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health of the individual and his potential colleagues. 329 However, the
Advocate General's reasons for concluding that the objective was justifiably protection of health were much weaker than that of the medical institutions in Leckelt330 and Glover.331 The Advocate General
was concerned that possible repeated absenteeism due to illness
would result in added work and stress for X's colleagues, even for the
mere six months that X would be employed. 32 Leckelt and Glover
were concerned, respectively, about transmission of the disease to patients during medical treatment and transmission during the handling
of its patients. These concerns are arguably more valid as health concerns than a few staff members' possible fatigue. In addition, other
candidates who might also experience frequent absenteeism, such as
single parents with small children, are not subject to such discrimination while posing a similar "risk" to their fellow colleagues. 33 While
the ECJ did uphold X's right to privacy,334 acceptance of such a limited health concern could hinder the protection of a candidate's privacy right in a different factual situation.
A critical problem in X v. Commission is the ECJ's dicta suggesting
that the institutions are not obliged to hire a candidate who refuses to
undergo an HIV test. 335 This decision essentially makes the HIV test
mandatory, because the hiring institution can reject a candidate solely
on the basis of his refusal. It also violates the spirit of the ECHR's
Article 8, which mandates no intrusions on an individual's privacy
ex336
cept, among others purposes, for the protection of health. 3 As one
commentator noted, by failing to "set some justiciable limits to the
examinations that can be required, ' 337 the ECJ grants "the Community institutions with considerable discretionary power to choose the
method of examination for determining a candidate's physical[ ] suita329. Case 404/92, X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737, 4763-64. Both the Advo-

cate General and the ECJ also recognized fitness for duty as a legitimate purpose. Id.
at 4763-64, 4790. The ECJ further found that the medical exam, including the HIV
test, properly served this objective. Id. at 4790.
330. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
332. X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. at 4763.
333. " '[A]bsenteeism is generally higher among women than men ....

[and] the

average employee with latchkey children' misses work on average 40 percent more
often than other workers." Time Crunch, supra note 276, at d9 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted); see also Jessica Primoff Vistnes, Gender Differences in Days Lost
from Work Due to Illness, 50 Indus. & Labor Rel. Rev. 304, 321 (1997) (finding that a
woman's probability of missing work as well as the length of her absence is increased
if she has young children).
334. The Court ruled that the Commission's HIV test in this instance was not proportional to the objective of protection of health because X had explicitly refused to
undertake such a test. The Court never reached the issue of risk of transmission, like
the courts in Glover and Leckelt. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
335. See 1994 E.C.R. at 4790.
336. ECHR, supra note 41, art. 8(2).
337. De Smijter, supra note 85, at 336.
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'
bility for a given position."338
Applicants will suffer either an invasion
of privacy or loss of the ability to obtain a job with the institutions, a
result that violates the essence of Article 8's privacy right, which the
ECI has undertaken to ensure.339
The ECJ's dicta is also inconsistent with the Conclusions, which
clearly state that there are "no grounds for screening potential recruits
for HIV antibodies," and that employees should not be under any obligation to notify their employers of HIV infection.3 0 While protection of health is a legitimate objective in general, according to the
Conclusions it is not legitimate in the case of HIV/AIDS because "[i]n
work settings, there is no risk of HIV infection or of acquiring
AIDS."'" The inevitable result of this policy is discrimination, which
the Council and the Member State Ministers for Health have deemed
a violation of human rights.' 2 In addition, refusal to hire a candidate
who may or may not be seropositive solely because he declines to submit to an HIV test is not proportional to the objective of determining
fitness for duty.313
Although the ECI did not expressly identify the risk the institutions
would be taking in hiring a candidate who refused to submit to an
HIV test, one possible inference is future costs. ' As the Advocate
General noted in his opinion, the Commission argued that pre-recruitment medical examinations correspond "to a social choice generally
accepted in Europe with regard to the distribution of social burdens[,]

..namely that an employer does not have to bear the economic cost
of sickness . . . resulting from a risk which the employee incurred

before his recruitment. '' 3 S The Advocate General found the argument unpersuasive as a defense to not hiring an applicant and pointed
out that this societal choice is better reflected by a policy of permitting
338. Id.

339. See Case 11170, IHG, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134 (stating that the ECJ protects
general principles of Community law, including respect for fundamental rights); Case
5/88, Wachauf v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 2609, 2639 (noting that "fundamental rights
form an integral part of the general principles of the law, the observance of which is
ensured by the [ECJ]").

340. Conclusions, supra note 73, at 2.
341. Id The Council did adopt Conclusions on health care workers, which includes
a provision regarding risk of HIV infection. Conclusion of the Council and the Ministers for Health of the Member States Meeting Within the Council of May 16, 1989 on
Awareness Measures for Health Care Personnel, 1989 OJ. (C 185) 6 (noting that "the
risk of HIV infection is slight and virtually non-existent if protective measures appropriate to the channels of HIV transmission are observed").
342. Resolution, supra note 74, at 4.
343. See Case 62/90, Commission v. Germany, 1992 E.C.R. 1-2575, 2609 (applying
the proportionality principle to the measure restricting the right to privacy).
344. The Local 1812 court also considered this factor when deciding whether HIVpositive employees are fit for duty. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
United State Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.D.C. 1987); supra note 281-85 and
accompanying text.
345. Case 404/92, X v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 4737, 4763.
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the employer to opt to exclude from reimbursement expenses arising
from a pre-existing condition.346 In the case of X, however, the risk of
significant future costs seems minimal since X was only applying for a
six month post," 7 and thus the cost of any health care problems would
have been minor.
In A v. Commission, the CFI also found legitimate the objective of
fitness for duty, as it "is perfectly lawful within any system of public
administration" and thus not contrary to the principle of respect of an
individual's private life.' This decision violates the spirit of the Conclusions, which the CFI did not consider once they found A symptomatic. The CFI took advantage of a loophole that the Conclusions
seem to leave in the protection of symptomatic applicants. While they
state that asymptomatic employees should be treated as fit for
work,34 9 they do not expressly state the same conclusion regarding
symptomatic employees. 30 The Conclusions do state, however, that
all HIV-positive individuals pose no danger to their colleagues and
that there is no basis for HIV screening regarding risk to fellow workers.351 Thus, it would seem reasonable to treat symptomatic employees similar to individuals with other serious illnesses.
Also, the aim of the Conclusions is to protect HIV-infected individuals from discrimination, stigmatization, and invasions of privacy; the
Resolution even states that discrimination on the basis of seropositivity violates human rights.3 52 As one of the E.C. institutions, the CFI
should regard the Conclusions as rules of good practice and not use
this loophole to avoid compliance, especially when its decision results
in discrimination-precisely what the Conclusions attempt to prevent.
Like the Local 1812 court,35 3 the CFI took a very paternalistic approach when deciding that A was unfit. Although the ECJ has not
detailed the nature of privacy interests to the same extent as the
Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe,354 the ECHR mandates that interference in the privacy right should only be as "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of [inter alia] .. .the protection of
'
Arguably, the ECHR was referring to the public entity's
health."355
interest in protecting the health of others from identified risks under
the entity's control, not in deciding for an individual what protection
346. Id
347. Id at 4783.

348. Case 10/93, A v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 11-179, 201 (Ct. First Instance).
349. Conclusions, supra note 73, at 2.

350. Id
351. Id
352. Resolution, supra note 74, at 4.
353. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State,
662 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.D.C. 1987); supra notes 268-79 and accompanying text.
354. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); supra note 144 and accompanying text.
355. ECHR, supra note 41, art. 8(2).
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he requires considering his private health status.3 56 A had already
worked in a country with an inferior health infrastructure and a higher
risk of contracting infectious diseases and was willing to take the risk
of continuing such service. Whether some of the ACP countries posed
a greater risk than Mexico should be left for A to decide, not for the
courts. One could argue that the Commission has a valid concern for
efficiency if it has to replace A in mid-term; but the Commission always faces this risk when staffing offices in third world regions. Employees often do not fully anticipate the hardships of living in such a
region and ask to leave before the end of their term.357 Moreover,
employees who are not HIV-positive are also susceptible to diseases
endemic to the region.35
In addition to weighing the government's objective against the individual's right to privacy, the E.C. courts must also consider whether
such a measure is proportional to the objective. 359 The CH did not
discuss whether HIV testing is a proportionate means of achieving the
purpose of determining fitness for duty, perhaps because A voluntarily submitted to the HIV test after having disclosed his seropositivity.
This might have made the difference in judgment in X v. Commission,
where dissimulated HIV tests did constitute a disproportionate invasion of privacy because X had specifically refused an HIV test. If the
objective of the testing is to determine fitness for duty, denying only
HIV-positive candidates the opportunity to work in such locations
seems discriminatory, not proportional. The aim of the Conclusions
and Article 8 is to protect the privacy of the individual so that he is
free to exercise his autonomy. The CFI violated the purpose of these
instruments by making that decision for A, against his wishes.
356. Advocate General Van Gerven, in X v. Commission, agreed with the Commission's generally paternalistic view that an HIV test would protect health "in so far as
the obligation... prevents his being recruited to a post which might damage his state
of health." Case 404/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4737, 4763.
357. Jeffrey P. Katz & David M. Seifer, It's a Different World out There.: Planning

for ExpatriateSuccess Through Selection, Pre-DepartureTraining and On-Site Socialization, 19 Hum. Resource Planning 32, 32 (1996) (stating that many "firms have been
plagued by the problem of premature return of expatriate managers"); Charlene M.
Solomon, CEO Mom: The 77e that Binds a Global Family, Personnel J., Mar. 1996, at
82 (alteration in original) (stating that the "significant majority of failed expatriate
assignments [fail] because of the family").
358. Cathryn Creno, In a World of Hurt: Preventing Health Crises Begins at Home

for Globe-Trotters, Arizona Republic, July 7, 1996, at Ti (stating that "60 to 75 per
cent of travellers to Asia, Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean will get some

sort of illness or injury during their trips"); Emerging Pathogens: Hepatitis E and

Denguevirus Antibody Prevalence in Long-Term Expatriates, Infectious Disease
Weekly, Feb. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS library, CURNWS file, (stating

"[d]iseases such as yellow fever and hepatitis A and B are well known as major health
risks to travellers to endemic regions"); Betsy Wade, Health, Too, Is Part of Planning

a Trip, N.Y. Tunes, May 29, 1988, §5, at 3 (discussing the dangers of getting sick when
travelling to third world countries).

359. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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C. How the Two Systems Can Be Improved
As seen above, a seropositive individual whose privacy has been
violated by an employer has recourse in both U.S. and E.C. law; his
right to privacy is more likely to be protected, however, under the
U.S. system. First, there are two avenues of protection in the United
States, consititutional and statutory. In addition, courts are supposed
to take into account objective medical opinion regarding the more dif360
ficult elements of cases involving HIV, such as risk of transmission.
Although the United States has more fully defined an individual's privacy interests, 361 the European Community can surely recognize that
these interests do not change at a geographical border. The United
States has taken the lead in protecting HIV-positive workers;362 the
European Community could follow suit, codifying the provisions of
the Council Conclusions into binding legislation. In the meantime,
both regions could work to resolve the remaining problematic areas
where protection is still not guaranteed.
One problem in the United States is in the Fourth Amendment
area. U.S. courts have not consistently protected the right to privacy
with respect to seropositive individuals, 363 mainly due to how courts
consider risk of transmission. The primary reason the courts in Local
1812364 and Leckelt3 65 did not provide adequate protection to the employees' privacy while the Glover court did was because Glover took
into account risk of transmission.366 While not a required criterion
under current Fourth Amendment analysis,367 courts should still evaluate the risk of transmission when balancing the government's interest
against the individual's right in order to ensure that fear and paranoia
are not taken into account and to provide full protection of the privacy rights. The balancing test would continue to require weighing
the invasion of the individual's privacy right against the government's
purpose served by the restriction; courts would simply add the Arline
factors, including risk of transmission, to the list of criteria which currently includes reasonability of the search and the individual's expectation of privacy.
Under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, courts must take into
account risk of transmission, and currently seem to provide adequate
360. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
361. Supra note 144 and accompanying text.
362. See supra part II.B.1.
363. See supra part II.A.2.b.

364. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State,
662 F. Supp 50 (D.D.C. 1987); see supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
365. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.
1990); see supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
366. Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989); see supra notes 170-73, 291 and accompanying
text.
367. Supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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protection of the individual's right to privacy in most work environments. The remaining area where violations still occur is in the medical context. As one commentator sadly notes, "[tihis is a situation
where we are fighting fear itself."3" Courts have been unwilling to
heed medical opinion where in other circumstances they have triumphed over the fear and prejudice associated with HIV/AIDS.3 9
Unless the Supreme Court answers in the affirmative "[tihe important
question ... [of] whether we shape policy based on extraordinarily
rare circumstances, '37 0 courts will have to make a greater effort to put

aside unfounded fears and examine objectively medical opinion in order to determine the true risk of transmission in any given case.
While the current E.C. system offers some protection of a seropositive individual's privacy, there remains considerable potential for violations, given the ECJ's dicta that institutions may reject a candidate
who refuses to submit to an HIV test and the CFI's paternalistic treatment of HIV-infected individuals.371 The ideal solution would be for
the institutions to adopt a binding legislative measure, similar to the
U.S. statutes, 37 that would fully protect the right to privacy. 373 In the

meantime, however, E.C. courts could improve protection under the
current scheme by following Arline's approach.374
While a Directive would address the Member States, it would also
form part of Community law, which the institutions should respect
and uphold.375 The Directive could loosely follow the provisions of
368. Symposium, supra note 318, at 31.
369. Discrimination: Policy-Makers Tend to View HfV-Positive Health Workers as
Risk, ABA Forum Told, 3 BNA's Health L. Rep. 26, June 30, 1994, at d4, availablein
Westlaw, BNA-HLR database, 3 BHLR 26 d4 (stating that most hospital decisions to
discriminate against seropositive HCWs are based more often on "exaggerated notions of risk than on actual risk of transmission"); Ansberry, supra note 13, at 6 (alteration in original) (The article quotes a doctor who says that doctors and nurses refuse
to treat AIDS patients not only out of fear but also because "[t]hey're making a value
...judgment about AIDS victims. They're saying they won't treat people [they find]
disgusting.").
370. Marc E. Elovitz, Why the Debate on Restricting Health Care Workers with HIV
Should End: A Response to Professor Closen, 41 N.Y.L Sch. L Rev. 141, 145 n.8
(1996); see also Symposium, supra note 318, at 43 (asking whether we can "make our
public policy decisions on [the] basis [of the public's fear of transmission] if we believe
that the risk of transmission from an HIV-positive health care worker is negligible at
best").
371. See supra notes 335-43, 354-58 and accompanying text.
372. See supra part II.B.1.
373. Other commentators have also suggested a Directive in this area. See Dworkin
& Steyger, supra note 13, at 324-28.
374. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
375. To guarantee the institutions' protection of candidates' right to privacy, the

Commission should amend its Staff Regulations to provide that: HIV testing is not
mandatory, there will be no negative repercussions from a refusal to submit to an
HIV test on a candidate's application; there will be no discrimination against seropositive candidates, symptomatic or asymptomatic, who are fit for work; fitness for
work will include the requirement that the Commission make reasonable efforts to
accommodate disabled candidates. The Commission should also add "disability" to
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the two U.S. statutes. The measure should cover "any person with an
impairment of a physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual nature who
faces obstacles to participation on equal and equally effective terms
with all others in all aspects of the life of the community. 3 76 Its purpose would be to guarantee equal opportunity to all individuals including those in the field of employment via anti-discrimination
measures and remedies377 and would ensure protection of fundamental human rights, including the right to privacy. Also, the Directive
378
would include the principle of "reasonable accommodation.
The European Community has already taken a few steps in the
right direction. First, the 1989 Resolution calling for implementation
of the Conclusions regarding AIDS and the workplace recommended
that Member States respect the aims and provisions of the Conclusions. The European Parliament and the Council issued a Decision in
1995 establishing a plan of action which included a Community analysis of actual and potential discriminatory situations in Member States
in the field of employment as well as a study of Member State implementation of the 1989 Council Resolution. 379 In 1996, the Commission proposed a Council Resolution on equality of opportunity for
people with disabilities. 380 Finally, in its contribution to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, 38 ' the European Parliament proposed
"inclusion of an explicit reference in the Treaty to the principle of
equal treatment irrespective of [inter alia] handicap." 3"
All of these steps move in the direction of added protection,
although a Directive would most directly guarantee the rights of seropositive employees. Recognizing, however, that measures falling
under social policy often reveal cultural differences, making adoption
difficult, 383 the European Community could still better protect the
its list of traits which will not be considered during the selection process. Commission
of the European Communities, Staff Regulations: Regulations and Rules Applicable
to Officials and Other Servants of the European Communities 14 (1993) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (currently listing race, creed, and sex).
376. This is the Commission's definition of a disabled person. Communication of
the Commission on Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities: A New European Community Disability Strategy, COM(96) 406 final, at 21 [hereinafter Disability Strategy].
377. 1& at 24-25.

378. ld. at 25.
379. European Parliament and Council Decision 1729/95/EC of June 19, 1995 on
the Extension of the "Europe Against AIDS" Programme, 1995 O.J. (L 168) 1, 5.
380. Disability Strategy, supra note 376, at 18-22.
381. IGC is a meeting to discuss amending the founding treaties for various purposes. Bermann et al., EC Law, supra note 27, at 16-18. For further discussion on the
1996 IGC, see David O'Keeffe, From Maastricht to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: The Challenges Facingthe Union, 1994/2 Legal Issues of Eur. Integration 135.

382. Preparation CIG 1996: Contribution du Parlement Europeen, Info-Note 26/
95, May 31, 1995, at 5 (on file with Fordham Law Review).

383. Bermann et al., EC Law, supra note 27, at 1155.
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right to privacy by improving the courts' treatment of aHIV-infected
individuals under the current human rights framework. 38
One way the courts could better respect the right to privacy in the
context of HIV testing is to follow the U.S. example of examining the
four Arline criteria, and the risk of transmission in particular, in light
of current medical opinion. Neither the CFI nor the ECJ addressed
this risk in their decisions.3ns If the courts had taken into account the
Conclusions' provisions, they might have considered this factor since
the Conclusions do address the risk of transmission.3-1
The courts also could have better considered the aims of the
ECHR's Article 8. As argued above, Article 8 protects an individual's
right to privacy with interferences permitted for certain government
objectives such as the protection of health. The ECHR could not reasonably mean that a government's interest in protecting the individual's own health at the expense of his right to privacy would be
legitimate. The privacy interest relates to an individual's autonomy,
and thus such a decision should be made by the individual himself.38
IV.

CONCLUSION

Both the European Community and the United States have
frameworks to protect the right to privacy, and have recognized the
protection of medical information as part of that right. Their respective balancing tests are similar, weighing the intrusion on the individual's right against the governmental interest served. The United
States, however, has added significant protection to this right through
its statutory system of safeguarding disabled employees from discrimination. The European Community's Conclusions are not nearly as extensive, but do cover the same basic principles of non-discrimination
by employers on the basis of HIV seropositivity. Although Congress,
the Council of the European Union, the Member State Health Ministers, and even some of the courts acknowledge the need to counter the
unfounded but prevalent fear of infection via casual contact, the European Community and the United States have not successfully
achieved the aims of eliminating discrimination on the basis of HIV
384. See supra part L.A.
385. The ECI did not need to address the risk once it found that the measure was

not proportionate to the aims. The CFI also did not address this issue, perhaps because it did not deem this factor relevant in determining A's fitness for duty and
instead focused primarily on the impact of the working conditions on the candidate.
The Advocate General, however, could have discussed risk of transmission when evaluating the threat X might pose to his colleague's health. The Advocate General only
cited as a concern the possible fatigue of other employees if X were repeatedly absent, missing the ripe opportunity to comment on the issue of risk of transmission.
386. Conclusions, supra note 73, at 2.

387. See Dworkin, supra note 277, at 12-13; Feinberg, supra note 277, at 446-92;
Sean M. Scott, The Hidden FirstAmendment Values of Privacy, 71 Wash. L Rev. 683,

722-23 (1996).
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seropositivity and maintaining a safe workplace while still protecting
the privacy interests of employees. Because of the growing number of
individuals afflicted with HIV, until current medical opinion achieves
greater weight in the courts' balances, discrimination on the basis of
HIV seropositivity remains a significant risk in the employment
sector.

